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THE LIMITS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY CRITIQUE OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
THOMAS 0. SARGENTICH*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly asserted that the United States government is
ineffective in addressing major social needs.' Such criticisms have
come from widely varying political perspectives and have focused
on a host of problems confronting the nation 2-including budget
deficits, unemployment, homelessness, unequal access to health
care, and many more.3
One prominent critique holds that the government's asserted in-
effectiveness derives from its constitutional structure. This cri-
tique takes particular aim at the separation of powers between the
legislative and executive branches. It contends that the division of
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. A.B., Harvard Uni-
versity; M.Phil., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I thank a number of col-
leagues for helpful comments and discussions about this Article or topics raised in it, includ-
ing Charles Tiefer, Robert Vaughn, Burt Wechsler, Herman Schwartz, Christine
DeGregorio, Patricia Sykes, James Thurber, Ira Reed, and Timothy Evanson. Special
thanks are due to Pamela Strauss for research assistance and Robert Kelso for help with the
manuscript.
1. Criticisms of the government's effectiveness are a staple of American life. They are
often accompanied by recognition of public disengagement from politics. See FRANCES F.
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 4 (1988) ("Only a little more
than half of the eligible population votes in presidential elections, and fewer still vote in off-
year elections."); Rhodes Cook, Turnout Hits 64-Year Low in Presidential Race, 47 CONG.
Q. 135 (1989). Lower-class and working-class people in the United States have a particularly
high rate of nonvoting. See generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra (discussing institutional
causes for nonvoting patterns by Americans).
2. The media are full of reports about unremitting social problems and the government's
ineffectiveness in dealing with them. For an example from the late 1980s, see Stanley W.
Cloud, The Can't Do Government, TIME, Oct. 23, 1989, at 28, 29 ("Abroad and at home,
challenges are going unmet. Under the shadow of a massive federal deficit that neither polit-
ical party is willing to confront, a kind of neurosis of accepted limits has taken hold from
one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other.").
3. See generally id. (mentioning, inter alia, educational deficiencies, the federal budget
deficit, the savings and loan industry crisis, health care costs and gaps, and housing
problems). Each day's newspapers and radio and television news broadcasts provide vivid
examples of persisting societal problems.
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authority built into our institutions interferes with efficacious
governance.
A leading expression of this structural approach may be called
the parliamentary critique of the separation of powers.4 I will use
this term to refer to critics who seek to modify our constitutional
structure in the direction of a parliamentary system. In particular,
the critics of concern here admire the British system. They are
often careful to adjust to American ears by proclaiming the need
for "reform," not radical institutional change.5 Although calls for
parliamentary reform have been with us for decades, they have be-
come especially loud in recent years.'
The parliamentary critics with whom I will deal tend to admire
the strength of the British Prime Minister as compared with what
they see as the relative weakness of the United States President.'
In particular, the British chief executive does not face an indepen-
dent legislative branch that regularly pursues its own agenda.8 To
4. I am using the term "parliamentary critique" to encompass various efforts to move the
U.S. system of governance closer to a parliamentary-style arrangement. Some critics support
dramatic change, such as having a Cabinet choose a Premier who would have the key execu-
tive role, and others embrace more limited proposals. This Article, in highlighting both ap-
proaches, discusses the basic premises of the parliamentary perspective rather than its de-
tailed proposals. The latter could be a fruitful topic of another article.
5. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Time for Constitutional Change?, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126 (1980-81),
reprinted as To Form a Government, in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT-THE BICEN-
TENNIAL PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 11, 16 (Donald L.
Robinson ed., 1985) [hereinafter REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT] ("We are not about to
revise our own Constitution so as to incorporate a true parliamentary system."); cf. Donald
L. Robinson, The Renewal of American Constitutionalism, in SEPARATION OF POW-
ERs-DoEs IT STILL WORK? 38, 53 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) [hereinaf-
ter SEPARATION OF POWERS] ("Those who say that we ought not to tinker with the system
are correct. A constitution is an organic whole .... Assuming then that the current der-
angement is fundamental, we need to consider basic revisions in the constitutional
structure.").
6. For a selected list of leading sources on the parliamentary critique, see infra note 107.
7. For a typical statement about the strength of the British system by a leading parlia-
mentary proponent, see JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE Gov-
ERNMENT 14 (1986). Sundquist states that in the parliamentary system: "Power is unified.
Responsibility is clearly fixed. Strong party discipline assures prime ministers and their
cabinets that they can act quickly and decisively without fear, normally, of being repudiated
by their legislatures." Id.
8. See LEOPOLD S. AMERY, THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION 25 (2d ed. 1953) (noting that
the British Prime Minister has "a power far greater than that of the American President" as
long as party support remains); W. IVOR JENNINGS, CABINET GOVERNMENT 18 (3d ed. 1959)
("If the Government has a majority, and so long as that majority holds together, the House
680
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be sure, the British Parliament can vote no confidence in the
Prime Minister and thereby can force a resignation or a new elec-
tion.' Yet in Britain this is hardly a common occurrence. 10 More-
over, a parliamentary system can be an extremely weak form of
government if a prime minister's power depends on a shaky coali-
tion of divergent parties.1 In modern Britain, however, there has
been a rather strong two-party system along with a winner-take-all
electoral arrangement that has tended to guarantee that one of the
two leading parties-Labour or the Conservatives-will dominate
Parliament. 2
Critics often contrast the separation of powers with what they
describe as the unity, effectiveness, and accountability of the par-
liamentary system." On these grounds they propose amendments
[of Commons] does not control the Government but the Government controls the House.").
These characteristics have been noted by contemporary parliamentary critics. See Cutler,
supra note 5, at 14 ("In a parliamentary system, it is the duty of each majority member of
the legislature to vote for each element of the government's program, and the government
possesses the means to punish members if they do not.").
9. For background on the British parliamentary system, see AMERY, supra note 8; HRG.
GREAVES, THE BRrISH CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 1955); JENNINGS, supra note 8; R.M. PUNNETT,
BRITISH GOvERNMENT AND POLITICS (5th ed. 1987); RICHARD ROSE, POLITICS IN ENGLAND (5th
ed. 1989).
10. See SUNDQUiST, supra note 7, at 14 ("In two-party parliamentary systems, of which
Great Britain is the model, votes of nonconfidence are rare, but on occasion the majority has
forced a prime minister in which it has in fact lost confidence to resign .... "); infra note
251 and accompanying text.
11. Contemporary Israel provides an example of a parliamentary system that often has
been prone to instability. There are others, including Italy and the Third Republic of
France. The number of parties and the existence or nonexistence of a system of proportional
representation are, of course, major determinants of the stability of a parliamentary system.
12. In recent years, the Social Democratic Party in Britain has scored some electoral suc-
cess, but its political power-like that of the Liberals-has remained limited. For discussion
of the Social Democratic Party, see PATRICIA L. SYKES, LOSING FROM THE INSIDFn THE COST
OF CONFLICT IN THE BRITISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (1988). For discussion of the British
government's reliance on a strong party base in Parliament, see PUNNE r, supra note 9, at
73 ("A government's position in Parliament is based to a great extent on the party system
and the strength of Parliamentary party discipline.").
13. For modem critics, see SuNDQUIST, supra note 7; Cutler, supra note 5, at 16 (advocat-
ing that the American system become "closer to the parliamentary concept of 'forming a
government,' under which the elected majority is able to carry out an overall program and is
held accountable for its success or failure"). For earlier descriptions of the parliamentary
system, see WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONsTrrUTION 221 (Fontana 1963) (1867) ("The
excellence of the British constitution is that it has achieved this unity, that in it the sover-
eign power is single, possible, and good."); HENRY HAZLrrr, A NEw CONSTrrIUTON Now 23
(1974) [hereinafter HAzLrrT (1974)] (stating that "the central virtue of the parliamentary
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to the U.S. Constitution embodying the spirit of parliamentary-
style arrangements. 14 Although changes in party rules and new
statutes designed to promote party cohesion also are often recom-
mended, 15 this Article will concentrate specifically on the critique's
constitutional dimension."8
My objective is to place the parliamentary critique of the separa-
tion of powers into critical perspective. First, I will trace the re-
petitive ways in which parliamentary critics over the years have
blamed political problems in the United States on constitutional
realities. Second, I will critically assess the view's empirical and
normative premises.
I would like to highlight two caveats at the outset. First, many
variations among different parliamentary systems are not dealt
with in this Article. The British model represents only one possible
combination of variables. I thus would not want to be misunder-
stood to be criticizing all possible parliamentary ideas as I examine
the reformist vision that has dominated the critique I discuss.
system . . .is the concentration of responsibility"). The 1974 edition of Hazlitt's A New
Constitution Now is a newer version of his 1942 book by the same name. See infra note 107.
14. For a partial list of constitutional and nonconstitutional proposals, see the widely
noted COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, A BICENTENNIAL ANALYSIS OF THE AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CON-
STITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1987) [hereinafter COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS]. For a discussion of
the Committee's work, see Mark P. Petracca et al., Proposals for Constitutional Reform: An
Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System, 20 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 503
(1990); James L. Sundquist, Response to the Petracca-Bailey-Smith Evaluation of the
Committee on the Constitutional System, 20 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533 (1990).
15. Recommendations for changes in party rules and statutes are often a response to the
condition of "divided government" wherein different political parties control the legislative
and executive branches. See generally DIVIDED DEMOCRACY: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT BE-
TWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (James A. Thurber ed., 1991); Symposium, The Ameri-
can Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209
(1989) (including articles by Lloyd Cutler, Philip Bobbitt, Erwin Chemerinsky, and James
Sundquist); Symposium, Divided Government and the Politics of Constitutional Reform, 24
PS POL. SCI. & POL. 634 (1991).
16. Although the perceived problem of lack of party cohesion could be addressed by such
measures as changing party rules and statutes relating to campaign finance, underlying
structural issues need to be addressed by constitutional amendments-if indeed there is to
be a legal as opposed to political response to them. To be sure, there is a close relationship
between party-related and constitutional proposals in much of the literature. Yet the two
are distinguishable, as one could seek to strengthen parties within our existing constitu-
tional structure.
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Second, the critics of concern here have advanced numerous spe-
cific proposals for constitutional change, ranging from the dramatic
to the more modest. My aim is not to discuss particular constitu-
tional proposals in this Article. Rather, my goal is to back away
from the particulars in order to consider general themes that link
generations of denunciation of the separation of powers from the
parliamentary perspective. As I will suggest, the parliamentary cri-
tique reflects a general system of ideas that needs to be looked at
with a critical eye.
My discussion will begin with a historical overview of key pre-
cursors of modern parliamentary criticism. I will start with the
views of British journalist Walter Bagehot, 17 whose work centrally
influenced his American admirer, Woodrow Wilson.18 During the
twentieth century, parliamentary arguments have been repeatedly
repackaged in widely differing contexts. 9 Each successive wave of
argument has shown a large intellectual debt to Bagehot and
Wilson.
Understanding the history of parliamentary reformism helps to
bring into focus the critique's empirical and normative limitations.
For decades, critics have asserted that catastrophe will overwhelm
our system if it continues to operate under the Constitution's
structure. Yet the sky has not fallen. The empirical case for major
change in the separation of powers, although dramatically asserted,
has simply not been established. 0
In addition, I will suggest, the idea that the nation would be able
to manage its way out of its political difficulties if its constitutional
structure were changed is remarkably reductionist. It disregards
key cultural, historical, and political variables that provide the vi-
tal context of the British-or for that matter any other-govern-
mental model.2
17. See infra text accompanying notes 51-71.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 27-50.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 106-86.
20. This is certainly not to say that our system is the best of all possible worlds. Nor is it
to deny that we could usefully consider particular ways to reform our system within the
general constitutional structure. Such reform lies beyond the scope of this Article.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 243-54 (discussing the British parliamentary
system).
19931
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Moreover, the argument for parliamentary reform does not pay
sufficient attention to the principle of promoting broad public dia-
logue in order to secure the legitimacy of constitutional govern-
ment.2 2 In particular, the parliamentary critics dealt with here em-
brace an extremely constrained view of the relationship between
the President and Congress. The critics' push for a stronger and
more unified governmental structure supports a managerial vision
of the Constitution that fails to appreciate the virtues of checks
and balances.23 At bottom, the parliamentary critique, as it has
played out in a good deal of commentary, tends to build up the
executive's power at the direct expense of the national legislature.
These tendencies need to be clearly borne in mind to the extent
that the heritage of parliamentary reformism continues to inform
serious proposals for change.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PARLIAMENTARY CRITIQUE
The parliamentary critique's intellectual lineage can be traced to
the mid-nineteenth century in England, the classical parliamentary
age.24 A leading journalist and political commentator during the
mid-Victorian period, Walter Bagehot, especially influenced the
most prominent nineteenth-century expositor of parliamentary
ideas, Woodrow Wilson. Because Wilson has been more influential
in American debate, I will discuss his ideas first, and then I will
show the linkages between them and Bagehot's views.
A. Nineteenth-Century Origins
1. Woodrow Wilson
During the century after the drafting of the U.S. Constitution in
1787, the government's operating arrangements gradually evolved.
In this period, key disputes about governmental structures tended
to focus on the relations between the federal establishment and the
22. See infra text accompanying notes 280-300 (discussing constitutional principles of the
American political system).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 262-79 (analyzing the parliamentary critique's
managerial ethos).
24. See R.H.S. Crossman, Introduction to BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 1 (describing the
mid-nineteenth century in Britain as the "period of classical parliamentary government").
[Vol. 34:679684
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states-culminating, of course, in the Civil War.2" After the Civil
War, voices were raised in critique of institutional relationships at
the federal level, with particular reference to legislative-executive
interaction.26 In the late 1870s, Woodrow Wilson published a paper
criticizing Congress for what he considered to be irresponsible gov-
ernment.2 7 He elaborated his views in an article in 18842s and a
book-perhaps his most famous academic work-in 1885.29
Wilson's 1884 article called for amending Article I, section 6, of
the Constitution in order to permit members of Congress to serve
in the President's Cabinet.30 In addition, Wilson supported coordi-
25. See JAMES M. BURNS, THE POWER TO LEAD: THE CRISIS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
204 (1984).
26. See id. Boston banker and congressional critic Gamaliel Bradford, who published in
journals such as The Nation, was a leading advocate of parliamentary reform during the
1870s. He was a direct influence on Woodrow Wilson, who more prominently developed the
parliamentary critique. See Gamaliel Bradford, Cabinet Officers in Congress, 28 NATION 243
(1879); Gamaliel Bradford, The Causes of Congressional Failure, 26 NATION 414 (1878);
Gamaliel Bradford, Shall the Cabinet Have Seats in Congress?, 16 NATION 233 (1873);
Gamaliel Bradford, Political Responsibility, 16 NATION 176 (1873); Gamaliel Bradford, The
Way Congress Does Business, 16 NATION 145-46 (1873); see also ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON:
THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 17-18 (1947) (noting that Gamaliel Bradford should be
given credit for cabinet government and other ideas set forth by Wilson in his early essays
on government).
27. See Woodrow Wilson, Cabinet Government in the United States, 7 INT'L REV. 146
(1879), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 493 (Arthur S. Link et al. eds.,
1966) [hereinafter WILSON PAPERS]. Wilson wrote that "[o]ur Government is practically car-
ried on by irresponsible committees." Id. at 495. He wanted to give cabinet members "seats
in Congress, with the privilege of the initiative in legislation and some part of the un-
bounded privileges now commanded by the Standing Committees." Id. at 498. He believed
that these members would be governed by a principle of responsibility that would require
them to resign if others in the legislature defeated their plans. Id. Wilson recognized that if
the President could choose members of Congress, then he would have power "plainly at
variance with republican principles." Id. at 499. He concluded that establishing the "highest
order of responsible government" obligated the President to select the Cabinet from among
members of Congress or, alternatively, members of state legislatures already selected by the
people. Id. Wilson argued that such change "would not be so radical as it might at first
appear." Id.
28. See Woodrow Wilson, Committee or Cabinet Government?, 3 OVERLAND MONTHLY 17
(1884), reprinted in 2 WILSON PAPERS, supra note 27, at 614 [hereinafter Wilson, Commit-
tee]; see also Woodrow Wilson, Government by Debate (an unpublished essay printed on
Dec. 4, 1882 that formed the basis of Wilson's 1884 article), in 2 WILSON PAPERS, supra note
27, at 159.
29. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMEN'. A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1885).
30. See Wilson, Committee, supra note 28, at 627-28. Wilson spoke of the parliamentary
system as the "prevailing legislative practice of the world," id. at 640, and he argued that
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nating the terms of office of members of Congress and the Presi-
dent." Both of these suggestions are classic, often-repeated parlia-
mentary proposals designed to limit the independence of Congress
from the executive.
Wilson's 1885 book, Congressional Government, expanded on
the argument for such proposals. He took for granted that Con-
gress was the most powerful governmental institution in the
United States.2 He contended that Congress was dominated by
committees that were unresponsive to the people33 and that the
administration of the laws was being carried out by "semi-indepen-
dent executive agents." 34
Wilson contrasted his picture of an unresponsive U.S. govern-
ment with his rather idealized vision of the British system.35 To
Wilson, the House of Commons was an especially accountable fo-
rum for vigorous debates about the day's great issues. "The whole
conduct of the government," he opined admiringly, "turns upon
what is said in the Commons . .".3."6 He pointedly distinguished
debates in Parliament from debates in Congress, which "have no
tithe of this interest, because they have no tithe of such signifi-
cance and importance. 3 7 The significance of the House of Com-
mons' debates inhered in the fact that Parliament could vote no
confidence in the government and thereby could force it to resign.
When legislative debates involve such high stakes, Wilson argued,
they are more likely to be conducted seriously. 8
Wilson's enthusiasm for the British parliamentary system was
the flip side of his critique of the separation of powers, which he
"English precedent and the world's fashion must be followed in the institution of Cabinet
Government in the United States." Id.
31. See id. at 628-29.
32. See WILSON, supra note 29, at 23 (describing Congress as the "central and predomi-
nant power" of the U.S. government).
33. See id. at 70-72. This is not to suggest that Wilson himself was a populist. See LINK,
supra note 26, at 15 ("Throughout the volume [of Congressional Government] one can de-
tect a strong bias against popular democracy and in favor of government by an aristocracy
of intelligence and merit.").
34. WILSON, supra note 29, at 24.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 78.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 78-79.
[Vol. 34:679
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saw as a prescription for "paralysis in moments of emergency" 9
and stalemate in ordinary times.4 ° He noted that under the separa-
tion of powers, few if any significant measures could be undertaken
by one branch of government without the "consent or cooperation"
of another branch.41 This meant that no single governmental au-
thority in the United States-neither the President nor Con-
gress-is the "supreme, ultimate head" '42 and therefore that
"[p]olicy cannot be either prompt or straightforward. ' 43
Wilson was aware that his analysis struck at the heart of the
Framers' design, which he frankly criticized for resting on a "griev-
ous mistake" of parceling out powers and responsibilities to differ-
ent branches of government.44 He imagined that if the Framers
were to reassemble in the early 1880s, "they would be the first to
admit that the only fruit of dividing power had been to make it
irresponsible. '45 He considered that the constitutional structure
lacked strength, promptness, and efficiency.46 He complained that
"[n]obody stands sponsor for the policy of the government. '47
Wilson's writing in the 1880s thus reflected a two-part critique.
First, he contended that when governmental power is divided
under a system of separation of powers, it necessarily becomes in-
effective. 4s This presupposed that unified power is required for ef-
fective government. The agent of unity in the British parliamen-
tary system is the Prime Minister's Cabinet, which consists of
department heads who also are leaders of the majority party in
Parliament. Second, he argued that when power is divided, it be-
comes irresponsible. 49 This view depended on the notion that the
possibility of "turning out" a government can permit the people to
39. Id. at 186.
40. See id. (noting the lack of single decisionmaking authority at all times in a system of
separation of powers).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (stating that policy "when it must serve many masters ... must either equivocate,
or hesitate, or fail altogether").
44. Id. at 187.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 206.
47. Id. at 207.
48. See id. at 186.
49. See id. at 187-88, 207.
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express their views on major issues, which in turn can keep the
government more responsible to the people.50 These arguments
about effectiveness and accountability, so central to Wilson's anal-
ysis, have remained at the heart of all subsequent parliamentary
criticisms of the separation of powers.
2. Walter Bagehot
Wilson's critique in the 1880s was directly influenced by Bage-
hot's study of the English Constitution, which was published in
England in 1867 and in the United States in 1877.sl Indeed, Wilson
specifically noted his intellectual debt to Bagehot.5 s
Wilson especially admired Bagehot's effort to move beyond a
"literary" view of government-the way it appeared in books-
toward an understanding of how institutions actually worked.53
Bagehot's most famous contribution in this regard was to distin-
guish between what he called the "dignified" and the "efficient"
parts of the English Constitution. The "dignified" elements, such
as the monarchy and House of Lords, had largely symbolic roles,
whereas the "efficient" elements did most of the work of gov-
erning.5
50. See id. at 196-99.
51. BAGEHOT, supra note 13. A second edition with a new introduction (included in the
Fontana edition) was published in England in 1872; this second edition was published in the
United States in 1877. See Crossman, supra note 24, at 1 n.1.
52. See 1 RAY S. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON: LIFE AND LETTERS, YOUTH. 1856-1890, at 213-
14 (Greenwood Press 1968) (1927) (containing an excerpt of a letter to Ellen Axson, dated
Jan. 1, 1884, in which Wilson wrote: "My desire and ambition are to treat the American
Constitution as Mr. Bagehot ... has treated the English Constitution .... He brings to
the work a fresh and original method .... "); see also Walter Lippman, Introduction to
WILSON, supra note 29, at 11 (referring to Wilson's letter to Ellen Axson in which he praised
Bagehot).
One result of Wilson's indebtedness to Bagehot is that any discussion of both of their
ideas, as in this text, is bound to reveal some degree of repetition. I have sought to keep it to
a minimum while giving a full flavor of Bagehot's ideas.
53. Compare WILSON, supra note 29, at 187 ("The 'literary theory' of checks and balances
is simply a consistent account of what our constitution-makers tried to do. ... ) with
BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 59 (emphasizing the contrast between the living reality and the
literary theory surrounding the British constitution).
54. See BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 61 ("The dignified parts of Government are those
which bring it force-which attract its motive power. The efficient parts only employ that
power."); id. at 176 (referring to "a double set of institutions-one dignified and intended to
impress the many, the other efficient and intended to govern the many").
[Vol. 34:679
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For Bagehot, "[t]he efficient secret of the English Constitution
may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of
the executive and legislative powers. ' '55 This view was in sharp
contrast to the literary theory traceable, among others, to Black-
stone, which held that England had an arrangement of checks and
balances between the executive and the legislature.5 6 In reality,
Bagehot contended, power lay in the hands of the Cabinet, which
he called "a committee of the legislative body selected to be the
executive body. '57 Bagehot also described the Cabinet as a "com-
bining committee-a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens"
the legislative and executive branches together.58
As Wilson was to do later, Bagehot praised the accountable char-
acter of executive leadership chosen from the membership of the
legislature.5" Bagehot also took pains to praise the House of Com-
mons, which he saw as the "great scene of debate, the great engine
of popular instruction and political controversy. ' 60 For Bagehot, as
for Wilson subsequently, what gave parliamentary debate such im-
Bagehot's dignified institutions operated in the context of a hierarchical class system. See
id. at 63 ("The lower orders, the middle orders, are still, when tried by what is the standard
of the educated 'ten thousand,' narrow-minded, unintelligent, incurious."). He noted that
the dignified elements of government inspire reverence:
That which is mystic in its claims; that which is occult in its mode of action;
that which is brilliant to the eye ... is the sort of thing-the only sort-which
yet comes home to the mass of men. So far from the dignified parts of a consti-
tution being necessarily the most useful, they are likely. . . to be the least so;
for they are likely to be adjusted to the lowest orders-those likely to care
least and judge worst about what is useful.
Id. at 64.
55. Id. at 65.
56. See ASA BRIGGS, THE MAKING OF MODERN ENGLAND, 1783-1867, at 89-90 (1959) (not-
ing that Blackstone in the late-18th century praised checks and balances as protections of
English liberty). For a modern discussion of the vision of British constitutionalism as em-
bodying checks and balances, see M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS (1967).
57. BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 66.
58. Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted).
59. See id. at 66 (referring to the benefit of "double election" by which the executive is
chosen from the elected representatives of the people).
60. Id. at 72.
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portance was the potential for the legislature to "turn out" a
government. 1
In addition, Bagehot prefigured Wilson's attack on the separa-
tion of powers as an essentially weak form of government. Under
"presidential government"-Bagehot's term for the system in the
United States-the executive can easily be "hampered" by Con-
gress.6 2 In contrast, "a strong Cabinet can obtain the concurrence
of the legislature in all acts which facilitate its administration. '63
The oneness of the two branches in England meant that the execu-
tive "is itself, so to say, the legislature. 6 4
Bagehot also attacked the fixed terms of office for officials under
the U.S. Constitution. The existence of fixed terms meant that
"whether [the government] works well or works ill. . . by law you
must keep it."66 Unlike the situation in a parliamentary system,
in the United States there is no option of calling a new elec-
tion-and that fact was seen by Bagehot to signal a key structural
weakness. 7
Bagehot's assault on the separation of powers included the broad
claim that it undermined sovereignty itself: "The splitting of sov-
ereignty into many parts amounts to there being no sovereign."68
Above all, Bagehot believed that it was necessary to maintain "sin-
gleness and unity" in government.6 The English Constitution was
seen to obey a "principle of choosing a single sovereign authority,"
whereas the U.S. government was seen to follow a "principle of
having many sovereign authorities" and to rest on a hope "that
their multitude may atone for their inferiority. 7' Bagehot offered
the opinion that only American "genius," "moderation," and "re-
61. See id. at 73 ("And debates which have this catastrophe [of a change of government]
at the end of them-or may so have it-are sure to be listened to, and sure to sink deep into
the national mind.").
62. See id. at 75.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 79-80 (criticizing congressional and presidential terms as "rigid, specified,
dated").
66. Id.
67. See id. at 80.
68. Id. at 219.
69. Id. at 221.
70. Id. at 220.
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gard for the law" had averted what otherwise would "long ago"
have been "a bad end" for the presidential system.7 1
3. Wilson's and Bagehot's Arguments in Historical Context
The nineteenth-century proponents of the parliamentary cri-
tique need to be viewed in their historical contexts. After all, Wil-
son and Bagehot geared their appraisals to political conditions in
their own times. Accordingly, the widespread reliance on their au-
thority by parliamentary critics in the modern period must be
questioned as fundamentally ahistorical.
In particular, Wilson wrote in the wake of the Civil War and a
succession of relatively weak Presidents.72 Moreover, Wilson's work
did not focus on the experiences of earlier strong Presidents, such
as Thomas Jefferson or Andrew Jackson.73 Furthermore, Wilson
wrote during a period in which Congress was dominant and in
which there was a lack of centralizing institutions within Congress
itself.
74
Conditions changed on many levels. By the early 1900s, there
had been stronger Presidents who provided a larger measure of na-
tional leadership under our constitutional system-such as Grover
Cleveland, William McKinley, and especially Theodore Roose-
velt. 5 In addition, there had emerged powerful legislative leaders
in the House of Representatives 76 as well as the Senate.77
71. Id. Bagehot argued that the U.S. Constitution was outdated, like an old will that was
misdrawn and difficult to work with in real life. See id. at 218.
72. See Robert L. Peabody, Afterword to WILSON, supra note 29, at 227 (describing
Andrew Johnson, Ulysses Grant, Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, and Chester Arthur as
"passive and ineffective" Presidents).
73. See id. (criticizing Wilson for failing to analyze the experiences of these strong
Presidents).
74. See id. at 227-28 (suggesting that Wilson's perception of committee dominance of
Congress in the early 1880s was reasonably accurate).
75. See BURNS, supra note 25, at 204-05.
76. See id. at 205.
77. See CHARLES TiEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 472-73 (1989) ("Only
near the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth did Senate party
figures gain control."). See generally HORACE S. MERRILL & MARION G. MERRILL, THE RE-
PUBLICAN COMMAND 1897-1913 (1971) (discussing the Republican Party's power and legisla-
tive performance); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, POLITICS AND POWER. THE UNITED STATES SENATE
1869-1901 (1966) (discussing structural changes in the Senate in the post-Civil War period).
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In the wake of such developments, Wilson himself fundamen-
tally shifted orientation. In 1908, he published another book that
took for granted the existence of a powerful President and did not
rhapsodize, as did his earlier work, about parliamentary institu-
tions.78 Wilson in 1908 stressed that "we have grown more and
more inclined. . to look to the President as the unifying force in
our complex system. ' 79 Having moved away from the British Cabi-
net and toward the President as the source of unity in government,
Wilson returned to the fold of commentators preoccupied above all
with U.S. institutions. Wilson's early-twentieth-century apprecia-
tion for the special role of the office of the Presidency stayed with
him as he shifted from being an academic to being Governor of
New Jersey and, finally, President himself.80
Bagehot, for his part, has been described by a modern historian
of the Victorian age as "the intelligent voice" of the mid-nine-
teenth century.81 The mid-century conditions in which he wrote
were rapidly overtaken by events.8 2 Specifically, Bagehot observed
English institutions in 1865 and 1866,as which was before the major
reforms of 1867 that expanded the electorate to include males in
the urban working class.8 These reforms, in the words of one corn-
78. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908).
79. Id. at 60. In 1908, Wilson wrote of the President:
His is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and
confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no
combination of forces will easily overpower him. His position takes the imagi-
nation of the country. He is the representative of no constituency, but of the
whole people.
Id. at 68. Wilson's approach in 1908 differed sharply from that of the early 1880s, when
Wilson was preoccupied by what he saw as Congress' dominance in national politics and the
burden of conflict between the legislative and executive branches. See WILSON, supra note
29, at 197-202.
80. See Lippman, supra note 52, at 15-16.
81. BRIGGS, supra note 56, at 514.
82. See Crossman, supra note 24, at 1, 17 (observing that Bagehot's study of parliamen-
tary institutions was already outdated when first published in 1867, the year the Disraeli
Government brought classic parliamentary government to an end by passing an electoral
reform bill).
83. See BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 267 (noting in the 1872 introduction to the second
English edition that the body of the book "describes the English Constitution as it stood in
the years 1865 and 1866"); see also Crossman, supra note 24, at 17 (praising Bagehot's
journalistic style in describing "the system as he saw it in 1865").
84. For discussion of the 1867 reforms under the Disraeli government, see BRIGGS, supra
note 56, at 503-14.
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mentator, "ended the classic age of parliamentary government"
that furnished the immediate context of Bagehot's study- 5
In addition, Bagehot's vision of parliamentary government can-
not properly be seen in isolation from a set of social attitudes
-closely associated with his era, class, and educational level.86 In
particular, he enunciated a relatively common Victorian concep-
tion of the marginality of the uneducated lower classes. He wrote:
"The working classes contribute almost nothing to our corporate
public opinion . ,,s Bagehot considered that "their want of in-
fluence in Parliament does not impair the coincidence of Parlia-
ment with public opinion." ' For Bagehot, "public opinion" con-
sisted of the views of the educated middle and the upper classes:
"Certain persons are by common consent agreed to be wiser than
others, and their opinion is, by consent, to rank for much more
than its numerical value."89
In these attitudes, Bagehot embraced the system of deference
by the lower to the higher social orders that was central to mid-
Victorian culture.90 A deferential society, "even though its lowest
classes are not intelligent," 91 was in Bagehot's mind "far more
suited to a Cabinet government than any kind of democratic coun-
try." 2 That was seen as true because cabinet government allowed
the "highest classes"93 to rule and thereby permitted "political ex-
cellence" to flourish.9 4
85. Crossman, supra note 24, at 17.
86. Bagehot's social attitudes were not unusual among the mid-Victorian educated middle
and upper classes. Realization of this fact helps place in perspective the author's work,
which is especially important given that this 19th-century critic is so often cited in 20th-
century parliamentary literature.
87. BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 176.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 171.
90. See generally id. at 247-50 (suggesting that the masses should yield to smaller groups
of select rulers). For a discussion of the politics of deference, see DAVID C. MOORE, THE
POLITICS OF DEFERENCE: A STUDY OF THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH POLITICAL SYS-
TEm (1976).
91. BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 250.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Furthermore, Bagehot wrote in a period of relatively weak politi-
cal parties,95 especially as compared with the situation in his coun-
try in the late-twentieth century. He specifically assumed that par-
ties were "not composed of warm partisans."98 Indeed, if that had
not been so, the result for Bagehot would have been dire: "Parlia-
mentary government would become the worst of governments-a
sectarian government. ' 97 His image of Members of Parliament pre-
supposed their ability to distance themselves from party positions
in determining the best course for the nation.98 In this sense, party
government for Bagehot was necessarily "mild."99
Bagehot's vision of the relatively independent Member of Parlia-
ment plainly predated many changes in the British political sys-
tem, including the extension of the suffrage, the growing role of
government in society, and the emergence of coordinated party
machines.100 Indeed, Bagehot opposed extension of the suffrage in
significant measure because he believed that it would lead to what
he called "constituency government," which he sharply distin-
guished from then-current parliamentary practices. 10 1 Constitu-
ency government amounted to "government of immoderate per-
sons far from the scene of action, instead of the government of
moderate persons close to the scene of action."'10 2
Bagehot's world differed in other fundamental ways from that
which later evolved in Britain. He could not and did not foresee
the extent to which debate in Parliament would become, in many
contexts, a sheer formality.103 Nor did he anticipate the rising
power of the civil service and the Prime Minister.104 He also did
not envision the changing role of the Cabinet. In modern conrmen-
95. See R.K. WEBER, MODERN ENGLAND: FROM THE 18TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 154
(2d ed. 1980) (arguing that in the period from 1846 to 1867, party discipline in England was
loose).
96. BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 159.
97. Id.
98. See id. (stating that Members of Parliament "are not eager to press the tenets of
their party to impossible conclusions").
99. Id. at 161.
100. See Crossman, supra note 24, at 35, 39-46.
101. See BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 161; see also Crossman, supra note 24, at 40 (noting
Bagehot's opposition to constituency government).
102. BAGEHOT, supra note 13, at 161.
103. See Crossman, supra note 24, at 43.
104. See id. at 47-56.
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tary, Bagehot's conception of the Cabinet itself has been seen as a
"dignified" form masking the real power of the parties, the bureau-
cracy, and the Prime Minister. °5
Accordingly, as one reviews Wilson's and Bagehot's parliamen-
tary critiques, one should simultaneously underscore their histori-
cal constraints. In this as in so many instances, observations geared
originally to particular times and places should be used cautiously
by succeeding generations to make claims about new and different
realities.
B. Twentieth-Century Critics
During the twentieth century, the role of the United States in
domestic and international affairs has expanded greatly, and the
President has become increasingly powerful. 08 Despite these well-
known developments, there has been striking continuity in parlia-
mentary-style arguments against the separation of powers.'0 7
105. R.H.S. Crossman observed:
By the turn of the century, when the party caucuses were firmly entrenched,
the efficient secret of the Constitution was no longer the fusion of the executive
and the legislature. [Rather, it was] the secret links that connected the Cabinet
with the party on the one side and with the civil service on the other.
Id. at 39; see id. at 51 ("The post-war epoch has seen the final transformation of Cabinet
Government into Prime Ministerial Government."); id. at 54 ("With the coming of Prime
Ministerial government, the Cabinet, in obedience to the law that Bagehot discovered, joins
the other dignified elements in the Constitution."). See generally JOHN P. MACKINTOSH,
THE BRITISH CARINET (3d ed. 1977) (providing a historical account of the Cabinet's role in
British government).
106. The tremendous modern growth of presidential power frequently has been empha-
sized. For a classic expression, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS
1787-1984, at 357-59 (5th rev. ed. 1984).
107. Twentieth-century books calling for parliamentary-style changes include the follow-
ing, in chronological order: WILLIAM MACDONALD, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW AMERICA
(1921); WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT, THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1935); HENRY HAZLrrT,
A NEW CONSTITUTION NOW (1942) [hereinafter HAZLITT (1942)]; THOMAS K. FINLETTER, CAN
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT DO THE JOB? (1945); GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, CONGRESS AT THE
CROSSROADS (1946); HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13; CHARLES M. HARDIN, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTION (1974); SUNDQUIST, supra note 7.
In addition to books on the subject, a number of useful collections of articles and other
materials call for parliamentary-style reform. See, e.g., Political Economy and Constitu-
tional Reform: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(containing hearings held by Rep. Henry Reuss on parliamentary reform); REFORMING
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5; SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 5.
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Constitutional proposals during the twentieth century have
ranged across a wide front. In 1921, William MacDonald proposed
having the President choose a Premier from among leading mem-
bers of Congress. 10 8 The Premier would lead the Cabinet," 9 and
the Cabinet, consisting of legislators, would resign office upon a
congressional vote signalling no confidence. 110 In 1935, William
Yandell Elliott recommended that the President be empowered to
dissolve Congress and to call a new election on one occasion during
his term.' He also urged that the Senate's powers be considerably
reduced so that legislative power could be concentrated in the
House of Representatives. 2 In 1942, Henry Hazlitt supported a
system in which the legislature would choose a Premier, who would
be the head of government and would select a Cabinet."13 Like
Elliott, Hazlitt wanted the Senate's powers to be severely cur-
tailed. 11 4 In 1945, Thomas Finletter urged the creation of a joint
executive-legislative cabinet." 5 He also proposed empowering the
President to call a new election to resolve conflicts between the
Cabinet and Congress. ' Moreover, he wanted the President and
members of Congress to be elected to simultaneous six-year
terms."
17
The basic aims of such proposals should be familiar to readers of
Bagehot and Wilson: they seek to make government more effective
and more accountable by altering the system of separation of pow-
ers. In this part, I will elaborate on these views with reference to
three main sources of parliamentary argumentation: Henry Hazlitt,
who embraced large-scale parliamentary changes during World
War II; Charles Hardin, who advanced parliamentary ideas in re-
sponse to the Watergate crisis of the early 1970s; and critics during
108. See MACDONALD, supra note 107, at 65-68.
109. Id. at 65-66.
110. Id. at 65-68.
111. See ELLIorr, supra note 107, at 9-10, 200.
112. See id. at 195 (urging a reduction in the size of the Senate and a limitation of its
power "to forcing the revision only of laws that do not affect revenues or appropriations").
113. See HAZLirrT (1942), supra note 107, at 124-30.
114. See id. at 176 (recommending that the Senate's role be limited to "delaying, revising,
forcing the House to reconsider measures").
115. See FINLETTER, supra note 107, at 88-105.
116. Id. at 110-16.
117. Id. at 110.
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the 1980s, who expressed particular concern about national budget
deficits. After reviewing these arguments, I will discuss major em-
pirical and normative limits of the parliamentary critique.
1. Henry Hazlitt and World War II
In 1942, journalist Henry Hazlitt called for sweeping parliamen-
tary reform.11 In so doing, he specifically emphasized his debt to
Bagehot and the early Wilson. In Bagehot, Hazlitt saw "the most
penetrating analyst of political constitutions in modern times.''119
In the early Wilson, he found an insightful forebear whose diagno-
sis of American government he approvingly recounted. 20
Hazlitt believed with Bagehot and Wilson that the separation of
powers was unworkable because it promoted deadlock between the
legislative and executive branches. 2' He also believed that it
should be possible for an issue to be taken to the country by means
of a special election.'22 An example of when this process would
have been useful, according to Hazlitt, was the conflict between
President Wilson and the Senate on whether to join the League of
Nations and the World Court after World War 1.123 Moreover, he
suggested that America's decision not to join the League contrib-
uted directly to Hitler's rise and thus to World War 11.124 Hazlitt
further indicated that America's success in World War II de-
118. HAZLITr (1942), supra note 107. I will give parallel citations to the 1942 and 1974
editions of this book when possible. See HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13.
119. HAZLIrr (1974), supra note 13, at 36; HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 15.
120. See HAZLIT (1974), supra note 13, at 45-48; HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 28-
32.
121. See HAZLIrr (1974), supra note 13, at 18-19 ("Thus frequent deadlock between the
President and Congress, or between the two houses of Congress is virtually built into our
constitutional arrangements."); HAZLrrr (1942), supra note 107, at ix, 4.
122. See HAZLiTr (1974), supra note 13, at 22; HAZLirr (1942), supra note 107, at 5-8
(opposing fixed terms of office); HAzLrrT (1974), supra note 13, at 87-88; HAZLITT (1942),
supra note 107, at 89 (stressing that public sentiment should be measured contemporane-
ously when the issue is decided).
123. See HAZLrrTr (1942), supra note 107, at 34-35. Hazlitt believed that President Wil-
son's support of the League of Nations would have prevailed "[i]f Wilson could have dis-
solved Congress and appealed to the country by an immediate election on the specific issue
of the League of Nations." Id. at 35.
124. See id. ("If America had participated in the postwar settlement, however, the whole
disaster of Hitlerism and the present war could have been averted.").
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
pended on whether there would be wholesale parliamentary
reform.'25
Hazlitt defended his ideas on traditional effectiveness and ac-
countability grounds. When speaking in the former mode, he drew
on military analogies. Suppose, he wrote, that "our troops were led
by three different generals, any one of whom could countermand
the orders of the other."' 26 The reference to three generals was
meant, of course, to evoke a picture of three quarreling branches of
government. For Hazlitt, disabling confusion was inherent in a sys-
tem of separation of powers. 2 7 Hazlitt also pointedly contrasted
our constitutional system with the unification of power in corpo-
rate life. 2 s
Hazlitt's accountability argument similarly drew on longstanding
premises of the parliamentary critique. He insisted that when
power is shared among different actors and things go wrong or
problems fester, it is difficult to assign blame. 29 As a result, in
Hazlitt's view, people tend to become frustrated with the political
process. 30 Hazlitt adopted a tone of urgency in rejecting what he
referred to as the "procrastinator's argument" for less than sweep-
ing constitutional change. 131
125. See id. at 4 (commenting that America needed to change its system of government
"to one less rigid and more responsible" in order to undertake the challenges presented by
World War II).
126. Id. at 7.
127. Hazlitt argued that the damage from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on De-
cember 7, 1941 was associated with the failure to unify military authority. See HAzrrr
(1974), supra note 13, at 148-49; HAZLrT (1942), supra note 107, at 279-80. He particularly
stressed conflicts between the Navy and Army. See HAZLITI (1974), supra note 13, at 149;
HAZLirT (1942), supra note 107, at 279. For Hazlitt, this example confirmed his thesis that
effective government requires concentration of responsibility. See HAzLirr (1974), supra
note 13, at 149; HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 280-82.
128. See HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13, at 59; HAZLiTT (1942), supra note 107, at 49 (ar-
guing that the cabinet system "is the form of government adopted by practically all large
American business corporations").
129. See HAZLITr (1942), supra note 107, at 140 ("For if we are to have responsible gov-
ernment, if we are to know whom to hold accountable for what is either good or bad, respon-
sibility must be centralized ....").
130. See HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13, at 89; HAZLIrr (1942), supra note 107, at 91 (as-
serting that the American public feels frustrated and powerless because of the structure of
government).
131. See HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13, at 91-93; HAZLIr (1942), supra note 107, at 95-96
(quoting a condensation of Jeremy Bentham's satire of the "Procrastinator's Argument,"
which urges one to "wait a little, this is not the time").
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2. Charles Hardin and the Watergate Crisis
In a 1974 book,13 2 political scientist Charles Hardin strongly em-
braced parliamentary proposals in response to problems of the
early 1970s. He was particularly concerned about the Watergate
affair.13 3 This affair involved not only a break-in during June 1972
at the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate office com-
plex in Washington, D.C., but also efforts by highly placed admin-
istration officials to cover up the incident's scope. The Watergate
episode-described by Charles Hardin as America's "gravest politi-
cal crisis since the Civil War"134 -- involved senior members of the
executive branch, including the Attorney General, key aides to the
President, and ultimately President Nixon himself. 35 A prolonged
process of congressional and criminal investigations culminated in
the House Judiciary Committee's vote for articles of impeach-
ment 3' and constitutional litigation about an independent prose-
cutor's subpoena of certain tapes of presidential conversations. 37
After the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Nixon 3 8 that
the prosecutor's subpoena was not defeated by principles of execu-
tive privilege, President Nixon turned over materials containing
132. HARDIN, supra note 107.
133. See id. at 1. For a later critique of the separation of powers, see CHARLES M. HARDIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN AMERICA (1989). For a critical review of Hardin's 1989 book, see
Douglas Kmiec, Debating Separation of Powers, 53 REv. POL. 391 (1991).
134. HARDIN, supra note 107, at 1.
135. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974)
(presenting an account of Watergate from the perspective of the reporters who broke the
story); JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMErrION (1976) (recalling Dean's experiences during Water-
gate as Counsel to President Nixon); MYRON J. SMITH, WATERGATE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOG-
RAPHY OF SOURCES IN ENGLISH, 1972-1982 (1983).
136. HousE JUDICIARY COMM., IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
137. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For discussion of the Nixon case,
see Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and
the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REv. 30 (1974); Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and
Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 76 (1974); William Van
Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV.
116 (1974). The executive privilege debate has continued. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Legal
Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege
Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
138. 418 U.S. 683.
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highly incriminating evidence. 139 This evidence was considered to
include a "smoking gun" that directly implicated the President in
a cover-up. 140 Shortly thereafter, Nixon became the first U.S. Pres-
ident to resign from office. 141
To Charles Hardin, these events revealed a major weakness of
the separation of powers. To be sure, one might well reach the op-
posite conclusion if one were to see Watergate as having demon-
strated the system's ability to survive a crisis. Hardin believed,
however, that a parliamentary system could have handled Water-
gate better. Under a parliamentary model, there could have been a
vote of no confidence in the head of government.142 This possibil-
ity, he believed, could have allowed the nation to avoid the painful
prolongation of the crisis. In our system, by contrast, the President
can be removed only by impeachment. 143
Since Hardin wanted the executive's survival to depend on ma-
jority 'support from Congress, 4  he argued that the President
should resign whenever such support disappeared. 145 He also pro-
139. See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE
198-208 (1976). Leon Jaworski was the Watergate Special Prosecutor from November 1973
to October 1974. See id. at 293.
140. Id. at 206 ("But the finishing blow was soon to come; the tapes would do [President
Nixon] in.").
141. President Nixon was the second President to be the subject of serious impeachment
proceedings. The first, Andrew Johnson, was impeached in 1867 by the House of Represent-
atives and escaped conviction by the Senate by one vote. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291-93 (2d ed. 1988).
142. See HARDIN, supra note 107, at 193 ("Party government would help the country cope
with crises by enabling ... the removal of politically inadequate leaders ... ."); id. at 192
(discussing the problem of a politically disabled President: "The proposal that the presi-
dent's congressional party should be able to replace him would take care of this difficulty.
Its wisdom is justified by recent British history.").
143. See id. at 6-7 (contending that impeachment is inadequate "because it concerns legal
criminality rather than political responsibility").
144. Hardin emphasized the need for majority support for the President in the House of
Representatives. See id. at 7 ("For an essential assumption would be that a president needs
a majority in the House of Representatives to govern.").
145. See id. Hardin expressed a qualification to his enthusiasm for strengthened majority
government with respect to "issues with a disparate local impact." See id. at 169-70. Accord-
ing to Hardin, race was this kind of issue. See id. A major party taking a position on race at
odds with that of a region of the country could not compete for majority support there,
whatever the party's attractiveness on other issues. See id. Hardin's concern about regional
issues, however, did not prompt him to question his basic support for centralized, parlia-
mentary-style government. See id. at 170-71.
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posed that the President, Senators, and members of the House of
Representatives be elected to concurrent four-year terms.146 In a
special twist, he argued that approximately 150 at-large members
should be added to the present 435 members of the House.14
These 150 members would be divided among the two major parties
after a presidential election in order to assure that the party elect-
ing the President would have a working majority in the House.4 8
Hardin also sought to foster the institution of an opposition
party.149 To achieve this end, he proposed giving a seat in the
House to the defeated presidential candidate of the two major par-
ties.150 The defeated candidate would be awarded membership on
House committees, access to the House floor for debate, funds for
an office, and an official residence. 51 At the same time, Hardin
proposed reducing the Senate's power by eliminating its ability to
hold up treaties or presidential appointments. 5 2 Also, under Har-
din's scheme, if the Senate rejected a bill and it was adopted twice
by the House, it would be deemed to have been passed by Congress
and would go to the President as proposed legislation. 53
Hardin maintained that there was no need for a constitutional
amendment spelling out either the President's power to dissolve
Congress or Congress' power to throw out the administration.5 He
expected that the practice of legislative votes of confidence would
"naturally evolve" in a setting reformed along the lines he other-
wise urged. 5 5 If a President ever lost majority support, "he
w[ould] be incapacitated and," Hardin asserted, "it would be logi-
cal for him to resign."15 6 Ultimately, Hardin believed, no-confi-
146. See id. at 183.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 183-84; id. at 187 (describing as his key goal: "the party capturing the
presidency will also control Congress").
149. See id. at 184-85.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 184.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 7.
155. Id.
156. Id. Hardin's reliance on "logic" seems odd given his otherwise keenly honed sense of
realism about political activity.
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dence votes could be expected to become "the normal way that one
government ends and another is chosen." '157
3. Parliamentary Critics of the 1980s
In recent years, parliamentary proponents have proliferated.
They include former executive branch officials,15 scholars,"59 and
many others. 60 Although they differ in their particular arguments,
they continue to advance key aspects of the basic critique ad-
vanced by their forebears. A leading source of contemporary ideas
has been the privately organized Committee on the Constitutional
System,' which received wide attention for a 1987 report urging a
package of parliamentary reforms."6 2
Contemporary critics take aim both at the separation of powers
and at what they regard as an unduly incohesive party system.
They deplore what is commonly called "divided government,"
namely, the control by one major party of Congress or at least one
House, and the simultaneous control of the Presidency by the
other major party.113 In six of ten presidential elections from 1956
to 1992-in 1956, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984, and 1988-voters "di-
vided" the government in this way by electing a Republican Presi-
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 5; Lloyd N. Cutler, Some Reflections About Divided
Government, 18 PRES. STUD. Q. 485 (1988). Lloyd Cutler, a lawyer in Washington, D.C., was
Counsel to the President at the end of the Carter administration.
159. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 25; REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5;
SUNDQUIST, supra note 7.
160. See generally REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5 (compiling papers by
members of Congress, members of the executive branch, governors, party officials, members
of academia, journalists, and lawyers, as well as labor, business, and financial leaders).
161. See COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14.
162. See id.; see also REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 68-71. For me-
dia response to the Committee on the Constitutional System, see Richard Lacayo, Is It
Broke? Should We Fix It?, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 54; Ruth Marcus, Constitution in Need of
a 200- Year Tune-up?, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1987, at A19; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Citing Chronic
Deadlock, Panel Urges Altering Political Structure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1987, §1, at 1. The
Committee was not entirely a united front at the time it published its proposals. See Taylor,
supra, §1, at 1 ("Senator Kassebaum [a member of the Committee] said that ... funda-
mental structural changes in the Constitution were not warranted.").
163. See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 75-76.
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dent and, at the same time, a Democratic Congress or at least
House of Representatives.'
It is important to underscore that concerns about divided gov-
ernment and the party system are not confined to partisans of the
parliamentary critique. Moreover, concerns about divided govern-
ment deserve and have received attention in their own right.', 5 My
emphasis here is on the way in which such concerns have been
used to buttress the basic program of parliamentary reformism. At
bottom, the would-be reformers argue that the stalemate said to
attend divided government is made vastly worse by the separation
of powers.' 6
For example, Douglas Dillon, co-chair of the Committee on the
Constitutional System, argued that divided government in a sys-
tem of separated powers leads to a condition of "stalemate when-
ever important and difficult issues are involved.'16 7 Lloyd Cutler,
another Committee co-chair, stressed that the President faces diffi-
culties in making agreements with foreign nations because of the
possibility of serious congressional opposition. 68 More generally,
he decried the lack of ability in the United States to "form a gov-
ernment" that will promote unity between the legislative and exec-
164. See id. at 77-78. From 1832 to 1992, national elections created a condition of divided
government in 62 of 160 years, or about 40% of the time. MORRIS P. FIORINA, DIVIDED Gov-
ERNMENT 6 (1992). From 1957 to 1992, 13 of the 20 presidential and mid-term elections
produced divided government. Id. In the 1992 national election, voters elected a Democratic
President and a Democratic Congress.
165. See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 164; GARY C. JACOBSEN, THE ELECTORAL ORIGINS OF
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (1990); DAVID MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN (1991); THE POLITICS OF
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (Gary W. Cox & Samuel Kernell eds., 1991); see also sources cited
supra note 15.
166. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 75 ("When government is divided, then, the normal
and healthy partisan confrontation that occurs during debates in every democratic legisla-
ture spills over into confrontation between the branches of the government, which may
render it immobile."); see also James L. Sundquist, A Government Divided Against Itself,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 24, 1992, at B1.
167. C. Douglas Dillon, The Challenge of Modern Governance, in REFORMING AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 24, 26. Douglas Dillon served as Secretary of the Treasury in
the Kennedy administration. REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 24.
168. See Cutler, supra note 5, at 12-13 (discussing the requirement of two-thirds Senate
approval for treaty ratification). Of course, Presidents often have made executive agree-
ments with foreign governments and thereby have avoided the constitutional requirements
that apply to treaties. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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utive branches in the manner of parliamentary systems."6 9 James
Sundquist, a member of the Committee's Board of Directors, also
embraced the basic parliamentary critique of the separation of
powers. 17 0 He argued that the problem of the federal budget deficit
has been exacerbated by a structural tendency toward endless
bickering between the President and Congress. 17 1 For these various
critics, such bickering has been a regular feature of modern Pre-
sidencies, including those of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and
Bush.17 2 To be sure, critics have acknowledged that President
Reagan achieved striking changes in national policy during his
early years in office. 17 3 They have insisted, however, that this was a
short-lived period and that the customary pattern is one of institu-
tional deadlock. 7 4
Recent parliamentary critics have continued to refer admiringly
to earlier authors, including Woodrow Wilson, 7 5 Henry Hazlitt, 1
6
and Charles Hardin.17 Also, many of the specific constitutional
proposals made earlier have continued to be advanced. 17 8 Although
the variety of such proposals continues to be impressive, attention
often has centered on three sets of ideas.
169. See Cutler, supra note 5, at 12-13.
170. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 75-78; James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political
Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States, 103 POL. Sc. Q. 613
(1988-1989).
171. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 78 ("[Tlhe government's impotence was reflected
most dramatically in its incapacity to cope with gigantic and unprecedented budget
deficits.").
172. See id. at 77-78; Cutler, supra note 5, at 12-13 (discussing President Carter's difficul-
ties with Congress over the SALT II Treaty).
173. SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 78.
174. See id. at 106 ("After the initial year [of the Reagan administration], the disman-
tling of governmental agencies and programs came to a halt. The president could lead the
Congress no further in the direction he had set for it .... ").
175. See id. at 69 (referring to Wilson as "still among the most trenchant and pertinent"
critics); Cutler, supra note 5, at 15.
176. See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 71.
177. See, e.g., id. at 72.
178. The reform repertoire is not exhausted by the proposals listed in the text. See also
id. at 206-38 (discussing other alterations in checks and balances, including, inter alia, giv-
ing the President an item veto power, restructuring the war power to free the President
from Congressional constraint, and limiting the Senate's power to block treaties). Again, my
goal is not to discuss specific proposals-which do vary in their particular orientations-but
rather is to discuss the historical background and general limits of the parliamentary
perspective.
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First, there have been recurrent proposals to lengthen the terms
of office of members of the House of Representatives.'" One goal
of such a step is to shelter officeholders from the pressures of con-
stituents and ongoing campaigning for reelection.180 The objective
of greatest concern to critics of the separation of powers is to coor-
dinate the election cycles of Representatives with that of the Pres-
ident. As argued by earlier generations of parliamentary advocates,
the coordination of terms of office could allow the President's coat-
tails to bring into the legislature a more supportive and like-
minded set of officials. s
Second, there have been renewed proposals to permit the calling
of a special national election at some point during a President's or
legislator's term of office.182 Even if the power to call such an elec-
tion were never exercised, its existence, it is said, would have a
deterrent effect on deadlock in government. 83
179. See CoMMrrr RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 10-11 (advocating a system
with concurrent four-year terms for Representatives and the President as well as eight-year
terms for Senators); REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 175-77 (giving the
draft language and pros and cons of a constitutional amendment extending terms of office);
SUNDQUIST, supra note 7,at 105-34 (presenting advantages of lengthening the terms of office
of Representatives to four years). For other discussion about altering terms of office, see
HARDIN, supra note 107, at 183 (proposing same-day election and four-year terms for the
President, Senators, and Representatives); HAzLrrr (1974), supra note 13, at 28-29 (propos-
ing four-year terms for Representatives and elections for one-fourth of the House every
year).
180. SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 111-16.
181. See id. at 134.
182. See id. at 135-64 (discussing a special election mechanism). The details of the assign-
ment of power to call a special elections are, of course, critical. A common suggestion is to
vest that power in the President and in majorities of either House of Congress, although
other possibilities exist. See REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 254-57
(providing draft language and analysis of a proposed constitutional amendment for holding
special elections); Cutler, supra note 5, at 14 (proposing that the President should have
power to call a new congressional election and that a majority or perhaps two-thirds of both
Houses should have power to call a presidential election). In 1974, Rep. Henry Reuss intro-
duced a legislative proposal for a vote of no confidence by Congress followed by special
elections for the President, Vice President, and members of Congress. H.R.J. Res. 1111, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in Symposium on the Reuss Resolution: A Vote of No
Confidence in the President, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 327, 331-32 (1975).
183. See Comm-rrrE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 16 (urging that serious consid-
eration be given to a mechanism of calling a new election when deadlock in government
occurs).
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Third, there have been repeated proposals to allow members of
Congress to sit in the President's Cabinet.'84 Such a proposal is
designed directly to lessen the independence of the legislature
from the President.'"5
In defending such suggestions, contemporary reformers have re-
tained the classic critique of the separation of powers as dogged by
indecision and unaccountability. 86 The reformers have been every
bit as assured of the urgent need for change as were earlier ana-
lysts such as Henry Hazlitt during World War II or Charles Hardin
during Watergate.
III. THE EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE PREMISES OF THE
PARLIAMENTARY CRITIQUE
As we have seen, parliamentary reformism rests on core premises
advanced by Wilson more than one hundred years ago and, before
him, by Bagehot.' 8 7 This is true despite dramatic differences in the
underlying political conditions at the various times that calls for
parliamentary reform have been made.
184. See, e.g., REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 182-85 (offering draft
language and analysis of a proposed amendment allowing for members of Congress to serve
in the executive branch). Additional proposals have called for Cabinet members to answer
questions on the floor of the Congress. See H.R. Res. 155, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (pro-
posing a monthly two-hour question period of a Cabinet member by the House); 137 CONG.
REc. E1816-17 (daily ed. May 16, 1991) (statement of Rep. Gejdenson) (referring to earlier
proposals by Rep. Pendleton during the Civil War, Rep. Kefauver in 1943, and Sen.
Mondale in the 1970s that called for a congressional question period for Cabinet members);
see also Thomas K. Finletter, Cabinet Members on the Floor of Congress, in CAN REPRE-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT Do THE JOB (1945), reprinted in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT, supra note 5, at 143 (responding favorably to the Kefauver plan).
185. See COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 11-12 (noting that it would not
be obligatory to appoint legislators to the Cabinet but such ties "would prevent stale-
mates"); SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 167-77 (analyzing proposals seeking to strengthen the
collaboration between the legislative and executive branches). Woodrow Wilson suggested
that the President should choose Cabinet members from among elected legislators in order
to achieve responsible government. Wilson, supra note 27, at 499, reprinted in REFORMING
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 131, 131.
186. See Cutler, supra note 5, at 15 ("Our separation of executive and legislative power
fractions power and prevents accountability."); Robinson, supra note 5, at 62 (contending
that "a simpler, more integrated system would be both more effective and more accounta-
ble" than the separation of powers).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 27-71.
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In this part, I will turn from the task of describing and clarifying
key commitments of the parliamentary critique to the task of as-
sessing the reform program's general premises. These premises are
found in the critique's broad arguments for constitutional change,
and they are not to be confused with specific claims at lower levels
of generality that attend specific proposals. For instance, the idea
of coordinating terms of office implicates many issues in addition
to the general premises underlying this and other parliamentary-
style suggestions.
My focus will remain on the critique's general premises because
if they raise serious questions, as I suggest they do, then the nature
of the debate that has been carried on should change. In my view,
the debate needs to focus much more than it has on fundamental
empirical and normative issues. It is understandable, to be sure,
that proponents enmeshed in a certain world view would seek to
focus on the technical aspects of changing a decried constitutional
structure. Yet we need to look more closely at the basic grounds on
which parliamentary reformers have denounced the separation of
powers. In my view, a closer look will reveal that the critique's con-
ceptual foundation is quite problematical.
I will first turn to the central empirical foundation of the parlia-
mentary critique. I then will explore its normative underpinnings.
A. The Empirical Foundation of the Parliamentary Critique
The key empirical premise of the parliamentary critique is that
the U.S. constitutional system is inevitably prone to prolonged and
debilitating stalemate. There are substantial reasons for question-
ing this broad-scale assertion.
To begin, the critique's empirical argument assumes that when-
ever there is conflict between the legislative and executive
branches, such conflict is a symptom of constitutional tendencies
toward stalemate.18  The possibilities that controversy could be
constructive or that fruitful negotiation could occur after some de-
gree of impasse lie outside the parliamentarians' frame of refer-
188. See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 74 (noting that relations "between the execu-
tive and legislative branches degenerate, as they often do, into conflict and stalemate");
Cutler, supra note 5, at 12 ("The separation of powers between the legislative and executive
branches... has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today.").
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ence. Moreover, the idea that different approaches might usefully
be joined together after a process of negotiation between the
branches seems to remain beyond their purview. Instead of con-
structive possibilities, what parliamentary critics regularly see is
confusion, paralysis, and weakness. 189
Such a simplifying vision has considerable difficulty dealing with
the subtleties of particular political conflicts. Take Henry Hazlitt:
he expressed his concerns about the course of World War II in
terms of a fear of deadlock between the executive and legislative
branches. 190 Take Charles Hardin: he conveyed his alarm about
Watergate in terms of a critique of structural tensions in our sys-
tem of government.' 9' Take contemporary critics: they often ex-
press their intense frustration with national budget deficits in
terms of their laments about the separation of powers.'9 2 Yet we
know that World War II, Watergate, and contemporary budget re-
alities are very different topics. Is it not evident that a critique
that treats them so similarly risks overlooking important complexi-
ties and alternative explanations lying outside a preconceived
frame of reference?
To elaborate, consider the World War II, Watergate, and deficit
examples along with two others prominently noted in the parlia-
mentary literature: the Senate's failure to approve the League of
Nations treaty after World War I and Franklin Roosevelt's 1937
Court-packing plan.
Let us start with the League of Nations experience. Assuredly, it
was an instance in which the President's policy was thwarted by
the Senate. Does that show structural "stalemate" in some general
sense, as Hazlitt claimed it did?1 93 Of course, the defeat would not
have occurred if the Senate did not have the power to stop a treaty
189. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 29, at 186 ("[I]t is impossible to deny that this division
of authority and concealment of responsibility are calculated to subject the government to a
very distressing paralysis in moments of emergency."); Donald Robinson, Introduction to
Part 3: Reducing the Risk of Divided Government, in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
supra note 5, at 127, 127 ("A broad consensus agrees that there are serious problems con-
fronting the nation, and agrees, too, that enlightened, coherent public policy could help to
alleviate them, but on the way to adopting these programs, the system falls into deadlock.").
190. See HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 13-14.
191. See HARDIN, supra note 107, at 1-8.
192. See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 6-7, 78.
193. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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by refusing to give it a two-thirds vote of support.194 What does
that prove? One needs to ask about the range of factors that actu-
ally prompted the treaty's disapproval. Consider, for example, the
personalities of key political actors, public concern after World"
War I about continuing foreign obligations of the United States,
and President Wilson's overall strategy for dealing with the Sen-
ate. 95 Ultimately, President Wilson lost the treaty when he re-
fused to negotiate with the Senate about the reservations it pro-
posed for the treaty."9 ' By contrast, to cite a modern example,
President Carter succeeded in obtaining ratification of the contro-
versial Panama Canal Treaties through compromises on reser-
vations. 97
In view of the complex texture of the political processes involved
in the Versailles Treaty debate, it seems remarkably overstated to
claim that failure to approve the agreement resulted from our gov-
ernmental structure. The structure was a necessary but by no
means sufficient condition for the outcome. Moreover, to focus on
the result of a particular treaty process is to overlook the larger
194. The Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
195. See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789-1989, at 426-27 (1989) (reviewing the period,
including the intense and important clash between President Wilson and Senator Lodge);
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & JULIET=E L. GEORGE, WOODROW WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE: A
PERSONALITY STUDY 268-315 (1964) (detailing circumstances surrounding the defeat of the
Versailles Treaty and suggesting that Wilson's anxieties played an important role in the
defeat).
196. See RAYMOND J. SONTAG, A BROKEN WORLD, 1919-1939, at 17 (1972) (describing Wil-
son as manifesting "unbending stubbornness"); see also WALTER C. LANGSAM, THE WORLD
SINCE 1914, at 748-49 (3d ed. 1936) (describing the split in the Senate over ratification of the
Versailles Treaty). The Senate voted on the Versailles Treaty on November 19, 1919, when
under orders from President Wilson most Democrat Senators voted against the treaty with
the reservations attached to it. See SONTAG, supra, at 18. The treaty did not win a majority.
Id. Negotiations continued during the winter, and on March 19, 1920, a majority did vote
for the treaty with the reservations. Id. The final tally was seven short of the necessary two-
thirds vote. Id.
197. See THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 274-86
(1979) (discussing the roles of President Carter and the Senate in ratifying the Panama
Canal Treaties).
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value of having the Senate participate, whatever the consequence
in a specific case. 98
Consider also Hazlitt's point about World War II. Hazlitt sug-
gested that the failure of the United States to ratify the League of
Nations treaty led directly to Hitler's rise to power and eventually
to war. 99 What about the role played by Germany in the causation
of World War II? Surely, multiple factors led to serious
destabilization in that country after World War I.200 These obser-
vations seem so plain that one has to wonder whether Hazlitt's
concern about World War II should be viewed primarily as an ar-
gumentative device for focusing attention on his structural argu-
ment.210 In any event, the United States helped to win World War
II with the constitutional structure that Hazlitt so vehemently
attacked.
Now consider Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, in which
he proposed expanding the size of the Supreme Court in order to
allow for the appointment of new Justices who could be expected
to approve New Deal policies.2 02 Hazlitt saw this plan's failure as
198. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1511 (1989) (providing a summary of the roles of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives in the treaty-making process).
199. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
200. A particularly divisive issue in post-World War I Germany involved the burden of
reparations payments demanded by the victorious allies. In May 1921, the damages were
fixed at $31.5 billion, to be paid in annual installments of close to $500 million. See FELIX
GILBERT, THE END OF THE EUROPEAN ERA, 1890 TO THE PRESENT 206 (3d ed. 1984). As Gilbert
noted: "All the German political parties were convinced that their country could not pay
this sum." Id. For discussion of post-War social unrest in Germany, see id. at 204-09.
201. See HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 4. Hazlitt expressed the following concerns:
America finds itself in a struggle for survival against the most powerful mili-
tary despotism that the world has ever known. The length and cost of this
struggle-perhaps its very outcome-may depend upon whether or not we find
soon enough the initiative to change our system of government to one less rigid
and more responsible.
Id.
202. President Roosevelt sought the authority to appoint one new member of the Su-
preme Court for each sitting Justice over age 70-up to six new members-at a time when
many Justices were elderly and had been voting to strike down New Deal programs. See
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. No.
711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), reprinted in PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE
LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, CASES AND MATERIALS. 277, 277-79 (1988); Franklin D.
Roosevelt, The Coming Crisis in Recovery and What Can Be Done About It, Radio Address
from Washington, D.C. (Mar. 9, 1937), in SHANE & BRUFF, supra, at 274, 274-76. For discus-
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another confirmation of structural weakness in the U.S. govern-
ment.20 3 His notion was that the President advanced a relatively
extreme proposal, Congress balked, and the President carried on in
other areas while dropping the Court-packing package.204 Hazlitt
asserted that in a parliamentary system, the Court proposal would
"almost certainly" not have been made.205 If it had been made and
if a majority in Congress had been against it-as ultimately was
the case in 1937-the President would have had to resign and face
a special election.206
As interesting as this speculation is, the Court-packing plan
seems to reveal the opposite of Hazlitt's suggestion: it appears to
illustrate the potential dangers of a parliamentary arrangement.
The plan is precisely the sort of extreme administration program
that could well not be stopped in a system such as Britain's. The
reason is that Parliament generally rubberstamps the administra-
tion's policies, assuming that the government has a majority in the
legislature. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has made this argument in
claiming that the lesson of 1937 was not that the Court-packing
plan's unpopularity should have sent the President packing, but
rather that defeat of such a plan in the first place would be un-
likely in a parliamentary system.20 7 So viewed, the example point-
edly confirms the importance of separation of powers and checks
and balances. 208
sion of the Roosevelt Court-packing plan, see generally JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE,
THE 168 DAYS (1938); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1938);
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court Packing" Plan,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 347; Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61
YALE L.J. 791 (1952).
203. See HAzLrrr (1974), supra note 13, at 86-88; HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 87-
88.
204. HAZLrIT (1974), supra note 13, at 87-88; HAZLiTr (1942), supra note 107, at 87-88.
205. HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13, at 86; HAzLITr (1942), supra note 107, at 87.
206. See HAZLITr (1974), supra note 13, at 86; HAZLrrT (1942), supra note 107, at 87.
207. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Leave the Constitution Alone, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,
1982, at 4, reprinted in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 50, 54 ("The
court bill couldn't have failed if we had had a parliamentary system in 1937.").
208. See id. at 54 (asserting that the "Constitution has worked pretty well" as "[ilt al-
lowed Franklin Roosevelt, for example, to enact the New Deal but blocked him when he
tried to pack the Supreme Court").
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The example of Watergate has been cited by Hardin as another
instance of the inherent weakness of the separation of powers." 9
The idea was that the extended period of investigation and over-
sight by the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the judici-
ary seriously weakened the governmental system.21 0 Parliamentary
reformers like Hardin would have preferred the option of a vote of
no confidence and a special election to save the nation from the
prolonged agonies of a burdened chief executive.21'
A key difficulty with Hardin's story is its presupposition that, in
Britain for instance, a special election would have been called. Al-
though that is theoretically possible, the notion takes for granted
that Watergate-like events would come to light in the first in-
stance. That is problematical, however, given the British system's
tendency to shy away from the kind of intense and independent
investigations of government that were critical in uncovering the
Watergate affair. 212 At a minimum, a majority in Parliament would
have strong incentives not to embarrass the executive unduly.2 3
After all, a new election could lead to loss of the majority's control
of Parliament and the government. Moreover, a new election would
require Members of Parliament to defend against electoral chal-
lenges. The Members could be expected to suppose that they have
better things to do with their time. Ultimately, one has to ask
whether Watergate shows that the U.S. constitutional system
failed or, in the alternative, that the system worked by allowing
disclosure of wrongdoing at the top of government.
209. See HARDIN, supra note 107, at 142 ("In the summer of Watergate, 1973, public mo-
rale in America was low .... On the daily television the White House 'horrors' and those of
the Committee to Reelect the President replaced the artificial traumas of the soap operas,
but without the promise of a happy ending.").
210. See id. at 157 ("Public disillusionment with politics was profound in 1973.").
211. See id. at 145 ("What the public could decide is whether the Nixon administration
was worthy of its confidence .. ").
212. One should also mention the special role of the federal judiciary. For discussion of
the point about the British legislature, see Schlesinger, supra note 207, at 52. Cf. MARTIN
BAILEY, OILGATE: THE SANCTIONS SCANDAL (1979) (revealing how United Nations sanctions
against exports to what was then known as Rhodesia were broken during the 1960s and
1970s by British companies, and noting that there was a shroud of governmental secrecy
surrounding the matter.) The book's title, "Oilgate," was meant to conjure up images of a
British Watergate that the British government never carefully investigated. Anthony Samp-
son, Introduction to BAILEY, supra, at 7.
213. See Schlesinger, supra note 207, at 52.
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Finally, consider the often-cited example of continuing national
budget deficits.214 For contemporary parliamentary critics, the sep-
aration of powers and divided government have worked together to
create what might be called a situation of hyper-stalemate in ad-
dressing the deficits.215 The underlying empirical assessment is
traditional: it is that the U.S. constitutional system is prone to
deadlock and weakness.
Yet numerous factors appear to account for the nation's bud-
getary situation that have little to do as such with the legislative-
executive separation of powers. Of clear importance in the creation
of large deficits were numerous policy decisions during the 1980s
that simultaneously reduced- income taxes, funded social programs,
and supported a large defense build-up.216 Conscious policymak-
ing, not structural inevitabilities, generated massive deficits.
21 7
One might respond by urging that the persistence of the deficits
requires a separate explanation and that the best one is structural
stalemate between the legislative and executive branches. This ex-
planation also is extremely problematical. The fact is that national
policymakers and commentators have vigorously disagreed about
214. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 78 ("As the revenue shortfall reached $200 billion
annually, the president and spokesmen for both parties in both houses of the Congress sepa-
rately warned the nation of impending disaster, but together they could not muster the will
to act."). For discussion of budget reform, see James A. Thurber & Samantha L. Durst,
Delay, Deadlock, and Deficits: Evaluating Proposals for Congressional Budget Reform, in
FEDERAL BUDGET AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM 53, 53 (Thomas D. Lynch ed., 1991)
("Since the passage of the [Congressional] Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
(P.L. 93-344), delay, deadlock, deficits, and ever increasing debt have been a regular feature
of congressional budgeting.").
215. See Dillon, supra note 167, at 27 (characterizing stalemate as stemming from "the
inability of our system to clearly place the responsibility for action in any one place"); cf.
James Q. Wilson, Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?, PuB. INTEREST, Winter 1987,
at 36, 44-45 (contending that "there is no evidence at all that the deficit is a consequence of
the separation of powers").
216. For discussion of deficit politics during the 1980s, see generally IRENE S. RUBIN, THE
POLITICS OF PUBLIC BUDGETING (2d ed. 1993); JOSEPH WHITE & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, THE
DEFICIT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEw POLITICS OF THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS (1988).
217. The asserted structural problems existed in the 1970s as well as the 1980s, although
the deficits were much greater in the 1980s. See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 77 (assert-
ing that "by the end of Nixon's first term relations between the branches had degenerated
into open warfare").
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what to do about the deficits.21 Some critics have argued that the
issue in general has been overblown.219 Others have supported a
variety of steps without coming to common ground about which
ones to take.220 Substantive policy controversies of such magnitude
cannot be explained away in terms of constitutional structure.221
When one backs away from the various specific examples that
have been said to illustrate the failure of the separation of powers,
the simplistic character of a singleminded structural explanation
comes into sharp focus. History and politics are more complex
than any unicausal constitutional explanation will admit. In partic-
ular, deep disagreements about the substance of policy-what peo-
ple are attempting to do-are at the core of periods of confusion or
conflict. It bears mention in this regard that the United States is
not alone today in the manifest frustration of its people with its
political process. Indeed, a number of established democracies in
the contemporary period-notably including parliamentary democ-
racies-show signs of tension between their leaders and their cit-
izens and evidence of political disengagement, division, and
doubt.222
218. Thurber & Durst, supra note 214, at 54 ("Some reformers call for procedural
changes, others for changes in the basic budgetary power of the president and Congress, and
still others for major tax and spending policy change as a way to solve the problem of defi-
cits, delay, and deadlock in the congressional budget process.").
219. See ROBERT EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFIcIT? (1986) (arguing that the
national budget deficit is a less serious problem than often supposed); ROBERT ORTNER,
VOODOO DEFICITS (1990).
220. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 63-64 (1990). Krug-
man argues that there have been at least four main positions on the deficit: 1) Democrats
who think it is a problem and requires tax increases to be cured; 2) Democrats who think it
is not much of a problem and that new spending is desirable; 3) Republicans who think it is
a problem, albeit not as big as the Democrats think it is, and should be cured by cutting
spending; and 4) Republicans who believe it is not a problem, although they support spend-
ing cuts anyway. Id.
221. The difficulties of addressing national budget deficits have been heightened because
the overwhelming proportion of federal spending is on national defense, social insurance
programs, and interest on the debt, with about 20% left over for everything else, such as
"AIDS research, education, drug enforcement, antipoverty programs, foreign aid, and the
cost of actually running the government." Id. at 74.
222. See E.J. Dionne Jr., Grumpy Days Are Here Again, WASH. POST, July 12, 1992, at C1
(discussing a "trend found throughout the world's democracies toward voter grumpiness,
alienation, disaffection and anger"). Factors cited as reasons for the current "Democratic
Distemper" include the decline of national economies and tendencies toward fragmentation
in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, and culture, as well as ongoing ideological debates in the
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Furthermore, significant and controversial policies have contin-
ued to be adopted in modern legislation in the United States. The
1970s, a period of divided government, was a time of major growth
in domestic programs through legislation.223 The 1980s also saw
much dramatic legislative activity.2 24 These facts directly undercut
the stalemate thesis. They may even suggest that the existence of
power in competing branches of government could promote the
proliferation of policymaking, for each institution may be able to
initiate action that the other might not have initiated.225 However
that may be, as an empirical matter the case against the separation
of powers must be strenuously questioned.
One is left with the thought that the parliamentarians' claims
may be less descriptive than normative in character. After all, the
ultimate idea is that our government should be less divided and
less conflict ridden. I will now turn to the critique's normative
underpinnings.
B. The Normative Foundation of the Parliamentary Critique
The normative foundation of the parliamentary critique has
three main aspects: a set of general standards for assessing the sep-
confusing post-Cold War era. Id. At a minimum, these observations should direct our atten-
tion to a host of political and historical developments that cannot be encapsulated by any
simplistic structural critique of American government.
223. The early 1970s have been called a "public interest era" in which numerous new
federal programs were created. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Per-
spective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1278 (1986); see also LARRY N. GERSTON ET AL., THE DE-
REGULATED SocmTY 32-34 (1988) (characterizing the late 1960s and early 1970s as an era
involving a broad push for social regulation); David Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in
Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 155 (Thomas K.
McGraw ed., 1981) (analyzing the federal government's efforts to regulate businesses in the
areas of environmental and consumer protection during the 1960s and 1970s).
224. Some of this activity was in the form of deregulatory legislation. See generally
GERSTON Er AL., supra note 223 (discussing the history of regulation and deregulation with
reference to the airline and auto industries, financial services, and worker safety). Major tax
legislation included the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1988).
For discussion of divided government in the post-World War II period, see generally
MAYHEW, supra note 165. In this significant book, Mayhew offers an extended argument for
the thesis that "important laws have materialized at a rate largely unrelated to conditions
of party control." Id. at 4. In sum, the divided government-causes-stalemate argument,
Mayhew contends, is not borne out by the facts. See generally id.
225. See James W. Ceaser, In Defense of Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS, supra note 5, at 168, 184.
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aration of powers; a particular picture of parliamentary institu-
tions; and a certain view of constitutional values in the United
States. I will discuss each of these matters in turn.
1. General Standards for Assessing the Separation of Powers
At the outset, one needs directly to confront the parliamentary
critique's key arguments about the alleged ineffectiveness and
unaccountability of the separation of powers. Both contentions, I
will suggest, are plagued by a striking degree of vagueness and, in
the end, emptiness.
a. The Effectiveness Argument
Everyone wants the government to be effective. Yet eventually
one has to confront the fundamental question evaded by the par-
liamentary critique: effective for what ends? Effectiveness, after
all, is concerned with the efficacy by which given goals are ad-
vanced.22 If I said that I was "effective" today in writing a letter, I
would mean that I accomplished my letter writing. To state that I
was "effective," however, is to declare nothing about whether writ-
ing a letter was the best use of my time. It also does not establish a
substantive basis on which to judge the finished product. Such an
evasion of substance is magnified when one speaks of an entire in-
stitution or set of institutions-indeed, an entire government-as
being "effective" or "ineffective." Again, the real question is: effec-
tive for what ends?
The parliamentary critique's tendency to avoid specific substan-
tive baselines is deep seated. The critique asserts that whatever
one wants the U.S. government to do, it cannot do it effectively.
This approach may well have been chosen to appeal to a wide
range of frustrated citizens. As one parliamentary proponent has
noted with frankness: "To support constitutional reform, one must
be prepared to gamble."2 ' Notably, one must gamble that the poli-
cies one deems acceptable will be implemented within the constitu-
tional structure so earnestly sought.
226. As a matter of definition, to be "effective" is, inter alia, to be "capable of bringing
about an effect" or "able to accomplish a purpose." WEBSTER'S TaIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 724 (Philip B. Gove et al. eds., 8th ed. 1986).
227. SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 12.
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Something terribly important is missing in a critique that regu-
larly avoids the substance of political debate. From the viewpoint
of people who, for example, opposed President Reagan's regulatory
policies, there were significant virtues in the system of checks and
balances that gave Congress the power to slow down or redirect the
administration's efforts.228 Moreover, this virtue of checks and bal-
ances is not limited to one partisan perspective, for the basic point
also applies to those who have opposed the policies of Democratic
Presidents.
The existence of two different approaches to the sequence of im-
plementing parliamentary ideas further highlights the effectiveness
argument's emptiness. The first approach would simultaneously
pursue constitutional and party-related reforms. The second would
advance party-related reforms first and only thereafter would pur-
sue constitutional change. On the former view, the constitutional
system needs to be altered immediately. On the latter view, the
nature of political debate in the United States, as carried out by
the two major parties, needs to be transformed first, and thereafter
one should consider readjusting the major institutions of gov-
ernment.
The latter view has been described by James MacGregor Burns,
who has called for revitalizing the major parties as the initial step
in strengthening the government as a whole.229 In particular, he
has sought a reinvigorated Democratic party that would capture
the energies of the left in domestic politics in order to match the
Republican party that has moved to the right in recent years.230
From this perspective, the existence of definite and discrete party
programs is an important precondition to effective governmental
reform.3 1
The key point here is that the effectiveness argument, cast as it
is at such a high level of generality, does not address or resolve the
basic choice that Burns notes. Once again, the argument reveals
228. Cf. SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA- THE RUSH TO DE-
REGULATE 28 (1983) (noting Congress' use of its oversight power during the first Reagan
administration).
229. See BURNS, supra note 25, at 201-02.
230. See id. at 233-34.
231. See id. at 235-36.
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itself as a remarkably empty vessel that is ready to be given highly
divergent meanings in ,particular contexts.
b. The Accountability Argument
The second major argument of the parliamentary critique-that
the separation of powers is an unaccountable system of govern-
ment-also confronts serious problems.2 32 The contention rests on
the premise that accountability requires unity in government so
that the people will know whom to hold responsible for success or
failure. Yet is the public so simple minded as to be unable to as-
sign responsibility for policy when both the executive and the leg-
islative branches have an active hand in shaping policy? Joint re-
sponsibility is still responsibility. To assume that one branch needs
to have overriding influence on policy in order for officials to be
accountable is to bootstrap a premise about cohesive government
onto the separate notion of political accountability.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the substitution of a major
check on government resulting from a special election, in place of
the multiple and ongoing checks now asserted by different power
centers on each other, would actually result in a net gain for ac-
countability. 33 After all, ongoing checks and balances between the
legislative and executive branches are themselves a source of politi-
cal accountability. The parliamentary critique seeks directly to un-
dermine this source.
In addition, one must question the notion that accountability
will be especially enhanced by providing for the possibility of a
special election.3 4 In general, elections do provide a mechanism for
holding officials accountable to the people. Yet parliamentary crit-
232. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing premises of the accounta-
bility argument); supra note 13 (describing unity, effectiveness, and accountability of the
parliamentary system as viewed by parliamentary critics); see also MACDONALD, supra note
107, at 25 (referring to the parliamentary system of government as the "system of responsi-
ble government").
233. See Ceaser, supra note 225, at 182-83 (noting that parliamentarians "rely on an elec-
toral check, rather than on institutional checks, to guarantee against abuses of power").
234. See HARDIN, supra note 107, at 193 (preferring flexibility in calling elections in order
to help a country in times of crises); SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 140-61 (proposing a system
of special elections as a modification of the impeachment process and as designed for emer-
gencies); see also supra note 182 (discussing proposals for special elections in the United
States).
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ics have something more specific in mind when they assail the sep-
aration of powers for being relatively less accountable than a par-
liamentary system. For the critics, a system that creates the
possibility of a special election will allow an issue to be taken to
the country so that a new, specifically tailored mandate can guide a
new administration, thereby rendering it more accountable to the
people.
As a practical matter, the idea of taking an issue to the country
to overcome governmental deadlock raises numerous questions. If
there is governmental conflict, why is it not also likely for there to
be deep division in the country? Moreover, can one expect an elec-
tion campaign to stay focused on a particular issue or cluster of
issues? In a heterogeneous society such as the United States, de-
bate in a campaign leading up to a special election could quickly
include discussion of many divergent issues. The underlying image
of a great national forum for resolving some particular question in
a special election might or might not turn out to bear any resem-
blance to reality.
Even assuming the existence of an unproblematical mandate re-
sulting from a special election, how does the parliamentary critique
deal with the likelihood of changing attitudes and conditions after
such an election? On the logic of the parliamentary position, an
electoral mandate apparently lasts in undiminished form until the
next election. What if the political climate significantly changes
and some different matters come to the fore, yet another special or
a regular election is not held?23 5
Furthermore, the parliamentary critique's emphasis on the use
of a special election to seek a national mandate to which the gov-
ernment is to be held accountable depends on the idea of a rela-
tively unitary perspective adopted by the nation's voting major-
ity. a23 How comfortably does the notion of a sweeping national
235. An example of a policy change contrary to any presumed "mandate' of a presiden-
tial election was President Bush's acknowledgment in June 1990 of the need for new reve-
nues, despite his 1988 campaign pledge against any new taxes ("Read my lips: no new
taxes."). See Bush's Sudden Shift on Taxes Gets Budget Talks Moving, 48 CONG. Q. 2029
(1990).
236. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 7, at 106 ("[P]oliticians await the new mandate from the
people that the presidential election is expected to confer."). One parliamentary proponent,
Charles Hardin, believes in party government as a means of allowing a "national commu-
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mandate on some overriding issue fit with the normative concerns
of modern pluralistic politics?2 37
One voice that is especially attentive to the diversity of Ameri-
can political life is that of feminist theory. 38 Such theory is con-
cerned that a dominant or unitary national attitude will likely
mean, in present historical circumstances, a male attitude. For
feminist scholars, a major goal is to preserve a sense of competing
social visions in order to take account of alternative experiences
and viewpoints. 39 Whatever one thinks of the feminist critique in
particular, it underscores an important general lesson. For those
who feel and are marginalized, the idea of a single national will, to
be somehow revealed in a special election, is likely to be threaten-
ing. It deemphasizes-many would say silences-those in a minor-
nity" to emerge. HARDIN, supra note 107, at 11 (noting that the aim of party government is
"to create political conditions to enable the national community that exists in the hearts of
the people to emerge"). Hardin, however, is critical of placing emphasis on a direct mandate
from the people as a basis for governmental legitimacy. Id. at 167-69 ("For [the mandate]
theory places an impossible burden on the people, subjects government to a regimen of pop-
ular control that cannot be fulfilled, and invites attempts to impose an excess of par-
ticipatory democracy on the operations of government.")
237. See Ceaser, supra note 225, at 184 ("The American people have learned to live com-
fortably with the idea that at any time there may be no general will or mandate in the
nation on policy matters."). For the pluralist view of American politics, see generally
ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed.
1971); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES (1981). For criticisms of
the pluralist conception of politics, see, e.g., THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d
ed. 1979); ROBERT P. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968).
238. A range of views is necessarily included in any reference to feminist theory. See, e.g.,
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststruc-
turalist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987); Martha Chamallas, Con-
sent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988);
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
239. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 238. For a defense of diversity in the context of mod-
ern debates about the revival of republican ideals in liberal democratic thought, see
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1988) (arguing for
normative pluralism in which politics is "the interaction of groups that are more than sim-
ple aggregations of individual preferences, but less than components of a single common
good").
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ity who have competing orientations. 240 This point is reinforced by
the fact that different groups and individuals do have diverse con-
ceptions of the good life. To assume without doubt that a system
of political interaction culminates in some unitary expression of
national will to which the government must be "accountable" is to
fail to grapple with the underlying societal complexity.241
In fact, it seems admirable to have a governmental structure
that fosters an ongoing struggle among diverse views and does not
promote the lasting domination of one particular orientation. A
different approach might initially lead to stronger government. If
so, it would purchase strength at the expense of democratic debate.
Moreover, in the long run a supposedly "strong" government as
imagined by parliamentary critics might well be weakened by a
tendency to disregard the diversity of Americans' views.
In important ways, the accountability argument is closely related
to the effectiveness argument. Both call for a more centralized gov-
ernmental structure able to pursue policies with less need for nego-
tiation between Congress and the executive. Unsurprisingly, the
problems with the two arguments are closely related. Both speak in
vague generalities, and both evade substantive differences and
choices in our political community.
2. A Picture of Parliamentary Institutions
A parliamentary critic might respond by suggesting that since we
are talking about alternative constitutional systems, it is necessary
only to establish that another structure has salient advantages over
our own. Let us present a general picture of the British system, a
proponent might urge, to understand its comparative superiority.
240. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 855
(1990) ("[F]eminists insist that no one community is legitimately privileged to speak for all
others. Thus, feminist methods . . . seek to identify perspectives not represented in the
dominant culture from which reason should proceed."). See generally sources cited supra
note 238 (listing works on feminist theory).
241. In so arguing, I do not endorse an optimistic rendering of pluralist theory that as-
sumes that groups can interact freely and that the outcome of political bargaining is there-
fore legitimate on process grounds. Such a theory makes innumerable assumptions about
access to the political process, bargaining power, and participation that are impossible to
conform to reality.
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A key problem with this response is that it tends to rely on a
caricatured version of the parliamentary system. In the first place,
the parliamentary critique often overlooks that the British exam-
ple is only one of innumerable modern parliamentary systems and
that others differ in basic respects. 242 It may be unsurprising that
parliamentary proponents of constitutional change in the United
States do not dwell on the intricacies of comparative constitution-
alism, but the burden of their argument should lead them to con-
sider main variations on parliamentary themes.
Moreover, in concentrating on the British experience, parliamen-
tary critics often fail to take account of the important ways in
which that nation's political system depends upon its unique his-
tory and culture. British commentators are not hesitant to point
out such relationships. As H.R.G. Greaves noted in his classic
study, the British Constitution cannot be understood "without ref-
erence to the chief characteristics of society. '243 Such factors as the
British class system and the relative ethnic homogeneity of much
of the country's people-without denying the significance of na-
tionality differences among England, Scotland, Wales, and North-
242. For a comparison of democratic governments, see AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES:
PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES (1984).
For works comparing parliamentary governments, see MODERN PARLIAMENTS (Gerhard
Loewenberg ed., 1971); PARLIAMENTS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (Ezra
N. Suleiman ed., 1986); REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE? (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1985).
Studies of developing democracies offer further discussions of politics in parliamentary
systems. See, e.g., POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DE-
MOCRACY (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1990). Professor Juan Linz in particular has written in
favor of parliamentary systems for developing democracies. See Juan J. Linz, Democracy.
Presidential or Parliamentary. Does It Make a Difference? (May 14-16, 1989) (unpublished
paper, on file with author); Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51
(1990) (containing an excerpt of Linz's unpublished paper). Professor Linz's discussions
take us beyond the specific topic of the parliamentary critique of the separation of powers.
For a reaction to Professor Linz's advocacy of parliamentary systems, see Donald L.
Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 73 (1990). Professor Horowitz
summarizes his arguments against Professor Linz as follows:
[T]hey are based on a regionally skewed and highly selected sample of compar-
ative experience, principally from Latin America, . . . they rest on a mechanis-
tic, even caricatured, view of the presidency . ..[and] ignor[e] the functions
that a separately elected president can perform for a divided society.
Id. at 74.
243. GREAVES, supra note 9, at 11.
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ern Ireland-should be contrasted to conditions in the United
States.244
In response, parliamentary proponents might well protest that
they do not wish to transplant British institutions wholesale into
this country. Yet even limited borrowing of basic ideas of another
country's political structure risks overlooking that those ideas
emerged in a distinct habitat. As James Ceaser has noted, the Brit-
ish parliamentary system functions as it does not just because it is
parliamentary but because it is British.245
Furthermore, admiration for British institutions should not
blind us to the fact that they have been sharply criticized in that
country. Many critics have argued that such institutions give un-
warranted power to the administration of the moment. 46 To be
sure, if one dislikes the policies of a particular government, one
might be expected to question the system.247 The point remains
244. My point is a comparative one. Looked at on its own terms, British society reveals
significant elements of heterogeneity. See PUNNETr, supra note 9, at 13-17 (challenging the
idea of British homogeneity in a discussion of nationalism, ethnicity, and religion); ROSE,
supra note 9, at 51-65 (discussing immigration and nationality issues in the United
Kingdom).
245. Ceaser, supra note 225, at 172 ("The system that operates in Britain, however, func-
tions as it does less because it is parliamentary than because it is British.").
246. See John Keane, Reform of the Rump, NEw STATESMAN & Soc'y, Dec. 16, 1988, at
29, 30 ("The trend towards a government-managed parliament is most evident in Britain,
where the executive has virtually unfettered control over parliamentary proceedings and the
initiation and progress of major legislation, and strictly controls the supply of information
to parliament.").
247. Criticism of the undue power of the modern Prime Minister came to prominence
during the period of Margaret Thatcher's government from May 1979 to November 1990.
See MICHAEL FOLEY, THE SILENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS 105 (1989) (stating that the Thatcher
government gave "cause for concern over the scale of central power and the extent to which
.it has been used not only to emasculate centers of organized opposition in the community,
but also to accommodate ever greater reserves of authority with which to control public
resources and information"); Michael Doherty, Prime-Ministerial Power and Ministerial
Responsibility in the Thatcher Era, 41 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 49, 56 (1988) ("From the evi-
dence to date, it seems that Mrs [sic] Thatcher favors a restricted role for the Cabinet; her
expressions of contempt for many of her Cabinet colleagues also suggest this."); Shirley Wil-
liams, The New Authoritarianism, 60 POL. Q. 4, 4 (1989) ("The doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty has become the doctrine of the executive in Parliament . . ... "); David S.
Broder, Queen Maggie I: Is Thatcher Destroying Britain's Democracy?, WASH. POST, July
23, 1989, at D1 (quoting a Conservative Member of Parliament about Thatcher: "She has no
notion of checks and balances. And in our system, once in power, a prime minister is nearly
absolute, at least until public opinion says she has gone too far."). See generally GEOFFREY
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that, as a general matter, British Prime Ministers have remarkable
power. 4 s
The source of contemporary concerns about the British execu-
tive's dominance is the same as the British system's singular
strength: a majority in Parliament basically guarantees passage of
the Prime Minister's program. As Sir Ivor Jennings observed in a
leading study of the British Cabinet, "The Opposition will, almost
certainly, be defeated in the House of Commons because it is a
minority."249
These points have not received sufficient recognition by parlia-
mentary proponents in the United States. The justification for
characterizing parliamentary government as accountable is that, in
theory, the executive in a parliamentary system can be voted out
of office by the legislature.25 0 A key problem with this image is
that, at least in modern Britain, the legislature generally does not
use the vote of no confidence as a serious or active check on the
executive.251
SMITH & NELSON W. POLSBY, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS 87-168 (1981) (ana-
lyzing contemporary British politics).
248. See GREAVES, supra note 9, at 96-97 (commenting that the Prime Minister's formal
powers "resemble closely those of an autocrat .... The Government is the master of the
country and he is the master of the Government. . . . His party, having a majority in that
House [of Commons], determines the action of Parliament, and he controls his party."); see
also Don K. Price, The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems, 3 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317,
320 (1943) (quoting Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in 1931: "Parliament has really no control
over the Executive; it is a pure fiction.").
249. JENNINGS, supra note 8, at 15-16. For other statements emphasizing the strength of
the majority party in Parliament, see ANTHONY H. BIRCH, THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 175 (1986) ("The real dichotomy in British politics is between the government and the
Opposition, not between the government and Parliament."); id. at 195 ("Ever since the de-
velopment of effective party discipline in the 1860s, the great majority of government Bills
have been enacted without substantial change."); RosE, supra note 9, at 109-10 (stating that
"[t]he pressure to follow the party line is strongest when a party is in government" and that
a different result would be "the worst outcome politically: the governing party would lose
office"); cf. BIRCH, supra, at 195-97 (recognizing that the Cabinet has more power than Par-
liament in the legislative process but disagreeing with commentators who have concluded
that Parliament "acts as little more than a rubber stamp in the legislative process").
250. See BIRCH, supra note 249, at 35 (describing the consequence of the 1832 Reform
Act as placing choice of government in the hands of the House of Commons: "When a min-
istry was defeated in the Commons on an issue of confidence, the Prime Minister felt
obliged to resign or ask for a dissolution.").
251. See PUNNETT, supra note 9, at 35-36 ("In modern constitutional terms, the dissolu-
tion principle is based on the responsibility of the Monarch's Ministers to Parliament, but
with the rarity of Government defeats on motions of confidence in the Commons today...
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In fact, one of the most important trends in British political in-
stitutions during the present century has been the sharp growth of
prime ministerial power.2 52 This development has been associated
with a marked drop in the Cabinet's power and the rise of a power-
ful civil service with a penchant for secrecy.2 53 Notably absent from
this picture is a legislature with incentives closely to review or
openly to question governmental policy. This absence is not sur-
prising. In the parliamentary system, if there is a loss of confidence
in the executive, the government will resign and new elections will
be held. An election obviously generates doubt about the future of
the power to request a dissolution has become a practical political weapon in the hands of
the Prime Minister."); RosE, supra note 9, at 109 ("[W]hen ministers served at the pleasure
of the monarch of the day and took their directions from the King, the Parliament could be
an independent check upon government.").
Votes of no confidence have been relatively rare in modern Britain. R.M. Punnett noted:
"In 1979 James Callaghan lost the initiative when the Labour Government was defeated in a
vote of confidence in the Commons and was obliged to seek a dissolution." PUNNETT, supra
note 9, at 34. In 1940, a change of power took place when Winston Churchill replaced
Neville Chamberlain without a vote of no confidence and a new election; rather, there was a
loss of parliamentary support and the formation of a new cabinet. See MACKINTOSH, supra
note 105, at 435 (observing that Chamberlain "suffered not defeat but a slump in support"
from the Conservative Party); Samuel H. Beer, The British Experience, 43 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 365, 367 (1975), reprinted in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 215,
217 (describing the scene in Parliament at the time of the change of power from Chamber-
lain to Churchill). For a list of changes of government in Britain from 1835 to 1957, see
JENNINGS, supra note 8, at 533. One commentator, who became a Member of Parliament,
observed: "And these are the only two ways a Prime Minister can be removed, provided he
has a majority and retains his health. One is a Cabinet coup, the other is overthrow at a
back-bench meeting of his Party. Both are so unlikely as to be almost impossible." MACKIN-
TOSH, supra note 105, at 434-35.
252. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 465 (1989) ("While the
parliamentary model formally assumes legislative omnipotence, in practice it produces an
almost unassailable dominance of the executive over the legislature."); Crossman, supra
note 24, at 51 ("The post-war epoch has seen the final transformation of Cabinet Govern-
ment into Prime Ministerial Government."). But see RosE, supra note 9, at 100-02 ("While
there is no denying that the Prime Minister is the single most important person in govern-
ment, it does not follow that the Prime Minister is all-important or the cause of everything
that is done in Whitehall."). Of course, there are limits to the Prime Minister's strength and
power. See JOHN P. MACKINTOSH, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF BRITAIN 73-89 (3d rev.
ed. 1974) (describing limits such as those deriving from breakdown in party loyalty and bad
relations with Cabinet members); PUNNETT, supra note 9, at 245-46 (emphasizing that the
Prime Minister, in order to stay in office, must obtain the approval or at the least the con-
sent of ministers and'the party's support).
253. See Crossman, supra note 24, at 51-53. For discussion of the British bureaucracy's
habits of secrecy, see PETsR KELLNER & LORD CROWTHER-HUNT, THE CIvIL SERVANTS: AN
INQUIRY INTO BRITAINS'S RULING CLASS 264-83 (1980).
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each Member of Parliament. Such a prospect does create strong
pressures-apart from those of the party system itself-for the
majority to support the Prime Minister.254
A satirical reflection of the absurdity of imagining that Members
of Parliament today are free to vote their consciences, as Bagehot
supposed them to be, is offered in Yes Prime Minister, a set of
fictional "diaries" by the Right Honorable James Hacker. 255 This
book captures a sense of the strong party loyalties of British politi-
cians. In a relevant passage, Hacker has come face to face with one
Professor Marriott, whose ideas about local government reform ini'-
tially had appealed to Hacker. Marriott has written a sequel to his
original article, and Hacker has asked him what the party's role
would be in the revised scheme. The voice is Hacker's.
Marriott beamed. "Well, that's the marvellous thing, you see.
The party organizations would be completely bypassed. MPs
would become genuinely independent."
I was aghast....
Humphrey [the Cabinet Secretary] smiled at me. "So if MPs
weren't dependent on the party machine they could vote against
their own government party and get away with it," he explained.
"Exactly," said the Professor again. . . . "It's the end of the
party machine. The end of the power of the whips."
I couldn't begin to grasp how such a system could possibly
work. "So. . . how would the government get its unpopular leg-
islation through if it couldn't twist a few arms? How would it
command a majority?"
254. See JENNINGS, supra note 8, at 18 ("Self-interest dictates support [of the party] even
when reason suggests opposition."); MACKINTOSH, supra note 252, at 125 ("The main func-
tion of MPs is to support their leaders, to attack the other side and to score the maximum
points with the electorate in preparation for the next general election."); RosE, supra note 9,
at 113 ("Rarely is an issue regarded as so important that an MP would want to risk the
survival of his party in office by voting against it .. "); see also Keane, supra note 246, at
30 ("[Parliament] is viewed increasingly as a rubber stamp of decisions reached
elsewhere.").
255. See YES PRIME MINISTER: THE DIARIES OF THE RIGHT HON. JAMES HACKER (Jonathan
Lynn & Antony Jay eds., Salem House Publishers 1988) (1986) [hereinafter YES PRIME MIN-
ISTER]. These fictional "diaries" were the basis of a popular television program in Great
Britain, which has been replayed on public television in the United States. The "diaries"
followed an earlier volume, THE COMPLETE YES MINISTER: THE DIARIES OF A CABINET MINIS-
TER BY THE RIGHT HON. JAMES HACKER MP (Jonathan Lynn & Antony Jay eds., Salem
House Publishers 1987) (1984), which was also the basis of a television program.
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Marriott's answer was all too clear. "That's the whole point. It
couldn't! A government couldn't command a majority! It would
have to deserve it.. . . And MPs would only favor it if the vot-
ers did too. Parliament would be genuinely democratic again."
I couldn't believe my ears. Who in their right mind could pos-
sibly come to the Prime Minister with such a dangerous propo-
sal? Only some damn-fool academic. As far as I was concerned
the good professor could return to the ivory tower from whence
he came-and pronto!25
The serious point here is fundamental: one must not overplay the
idea that the British Parliament is a serious check on the Prime
Minister.
3. A View of Constitutional Values in the United States
Parliamentary critics might respond that the separation of pow-
ers could have been well suited for an agrarian and isolated nation,
but it is not suitable today.257 This view conjures up an image of a
constitutional straightjacket that unduly confines a world power as
it seeks to address serious issues domestically and internationally.
From this perspective, the constitutional framework is said to need
a transfusion of energy from another model.5 8
The central assumption underlying the straightjacket and trans-
fusion images is that Americans are stuck with a rigid and unbend-
ing system. That assumption is wide of the mark. The institutions
of United States government have evolved dramatically since the
nation's founding, as shown by the tremendous growth in the
power of the President 259 and the emergence of so-called "indepen-
256. YES PRIME MINISTER, supra note 255, at 383-84.
257. See, e.g., Lloyd Cutler, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute's Public Policy
Forum (Nov. 25, 1980), in CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES 5, 5 (Robert A. Goldwin et al.
eds., 1987) ("The separation of powers is an anachronism, and one in need of some
revision.").
258. See id. ("Along with Woodrow Wilson, I believe we do need to do a better job of
forming a government in the parliamentary sense.").
259. For discussions of presidential power, see CORWIN, supra note 106; THEODORE J.
LOWi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDEN. POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985); RICHARD E.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER. THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER (1980);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 252. For a listing of sources on the presidency, see EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN PRESIDENCY: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY (Fred I. Greenstein et al. eds., 1977).
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dent" agencies.2 60 In other, not entirely consistent ways, the consti-
tutional structure has hardly been static.261 However superficially
appealing it may be to blame present problems on the decisions of
our forbears, a thesis about the dead hand of 1787 is unduly
strained.
In any event, one must consider the broader implications of a
frontal assault on the separation of powers as outdated, ineffective,
and unaccountable. The assault calls into question core aspects of
the Constitution, and it offers in their place a vision of firm and
unified governmental management. What does this approach
sacrifice?
Ultimately, a number of fundamental values are threatened. At
the most basic level, the argument overlooks the importance of de-
liberation, dialogue, and debate involving the institutions of U.S.
government and the public. I will develop this theme in two parts:
first, by elaborating what I will call the parliamentary critique's
managerial ethos; and second, by contrasting that ethos with the
principle of dialogue underlying checks and balances.
a. The Parliamentary Critique's Managerial Ethos
The parliamentary critique's leading image of government is of
an efficient machine of centralized decisionmaking that sets its
goals clearly, accomplishes them smoothly, and does not engage in
wrangling about ends or means. This is a highly abstract vision of
the job of government as one of instrumental management.
Given the parliamentary literature's tendency to focus on man-
agement values, it is unsurprising that often it explicitly or implic-
itly idealizes corporate structures of governance. 62 In fact, the
260. For discussion of the growth of independent agencies, see Susan B. Foote, Indepen-
dent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988
DUKE L.J. 223; Glen 0. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238; Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent
Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257; Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After
Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DuKE L.J. 779.
261. Consider, for instance, the dramatic growth in the power of federal agencies during
the 20th century. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990);
Rabin, supra note 223 (providing historical discussion of the growth of federal agencies).
262. See, e.g., HAZLITT (1974), supra note 13, at 59; HAZLITr (1942), supra note 107, at 49
(analogizing the cabinet form of government to the structure "adopted by practically all
large American business corporations"); see also WILSON, supra note 29, at 186-87 (stating
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literature reflects admiration for hierarchical forms of decision-
making in general.2 3 After all, if decisions are seen to move up a
chain of command with someone at the top able to say, "This is
it," there should be less room for the difficulties that attend a pro-
cess of broad debate about proposed policy.264
This managerial ethos inevitably highlights the executive virtues
at the expense of open deliberation and ongoing participation in
the political process. It also directly attacks checks and balances.
Even though bargaining can be expected to continue within the
executive branch, the critique would have it tamed in the relations
between the executive and the legislature.
Take, for instance, Lloyd Cutler's summation of the relative effi-
ciency of our system of separation of powers as compared with that
of parliamentary systems.26 5 He has contrasted the "success rates"
of the two forms of government.266 He defined success as the exec-
utive's ability to get its program through the legislature.26 7 Under
this definition, he has written, the constitutional system in the
that "in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, somebody must be
trusted").
263. See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 428
(1981) ("In charge of it all [the executive] is a single individual-the president-with the
capacity to say 'This is it' and co'mmand his subordinates to fall in line with his decision.");
James L. Sundquist, The Crisis of Competence in Our National Government, 95 POL. ScI.
Q. 183, 197 (1980) ("[T]he executive branch is well organized to prepare a comprehensive
and internally consistent governmental program. With its hierarchical structure, it can re-
present divergent views at the lower levels but blend and reconcile them at higher levels,
with a point of decision at the top.").
264. Consider Woodrow Wilson's criticism of the constitutional system for its lack of a
single center of power. See WILSON, supra note 29, at 186 ("There is no one supreme, ulti-
mate head ... which can decide at once and with conclusive authority .... In times of
sudden exigency [this lack] might prove fatal ...."). Consider also Henry Hazlitt's admir-
ing invocation of the hierarchical models of military and corporate planning, juxtaposed
against the separation of powers in order to show the latter's comparative weaknesses. See
HAZLITT (1942), supra note 107, at 7 (comparing the separation of powers to a military cam-
paign in which three generals can countermand each other's orders but "no one of whom
[has] final authority"); supra note 262 (noting Hazlitt's reference to American corporations).
265. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 25, 32 (1985); see also James Q. Wilson, Remarks at the American Enterprise
Institute's Public Policy Forum (Nov. 25, 1980), in CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES, supra
note 257, at 8, 8. ("To Mr. Cutler good policy or good government is the product or act of a
single will: It is an act of management, of allocation, of balance.").
266. See Cutler, supra note 265, at 31-32.
267. Id. at 32 (measuring efficiency "by the ability of elected leaders to legislate their
party's program").
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United States "is only four-fifths as efficient" as parliamentary
government when both the Presidency and Congress are controlled
by the same party.26 s When there is "divided government," he has
stated, the United States system is "only two-thirds as efficient" as
parliamentary regimes.2 16  He has proclaimed that parliamentary
regimes are "very close to one hundred percent" efficient .27  The
reason for parliamentary success in this comparison is that the ex-
ecutive generally can count on the legislature's support for
whatever it proposes, assuming that the executive's party has a
working legislative majority. 17 1
Cutler's characterization of the relative success of the two sys-
tems is striking for a number of reasons. To speak of success with-
out considering the content of governmental policy is to confirm
the parliamentary critique's basic tendency to avoid substantive
discussion of concrete public issues.2 72 Note also that in the end
the President's success becomes the definition of success in gen-
eral. It matters not at all what the Congress proposes. The under-
lying notion is that the government's manager-the President in
our system, the Prime Minister in the British system-needs to be
able to manage. This view removes from consideration the possibil-
ity that another branch of government might have something use-
fully different to say about public policy.
To be sure, managerialism is not a foreign set of ideas in the
context of American policymaking. Its image of "getting the job
done" efficiently is central to modern debates about the legitimacy
of the administrative process. 3 Managerialism also is at the root
of a number of important developments in administrative law, es-
pecially including the evolution of centralized executive oversight
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (discussing the strength of the Prime
Minister when his or her party has a majority in Parliament).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 226-31 (discussing the parliamentary critique's
effectiveness argument).
273. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process:
The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385, 410-419 (discussing the instrumentalist
notion that "the legitimacy of the administrative process turns on its ability to realize val-
ued public ends in an effective and efficient manner").
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of agency rulemaking.1 4 Yet managerialism is only an aspect of a
number of competing visions of public administration, and it cap-
tures only a few of the broader normative ideas associated with
contemporary ideals of administration.275 Moreover, it is one thing
to speak of administration in managerial terms, but it is quite an-
other to speak of the interactions between the executive and the
legislative branches in terms of such a vision. Managerialists may
be frustrated because Congress does not speak their language, but
that is precisely the point: Congress speaks the language not of
managers but of the democratic process, messy though it is.
The parliamentary critique's managerial ethos has profound im-
plications in the modern age of expanded presidential power. Since
the New Deal and World War II, it has been widely recognized
that the President has become the initiating institution of U.S.
government.2 The Presidency's centrality has reached such a
level that the holder of that office is often seen in popular terms as
the embodiment of national unity.27 7 In this context, a critique
that further exalts the President by calling for the dominance of
274. For discussion of centralized executive review of agency rulemaking, see generally
Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
533 (1989); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE
L.J. 451 (1979); Lloyd N. Cutler, The Case for Presidential Intervention in Regulatory
Rulemaking by the Executive Branch, 56 TUL. L. REv. 830 (1982); Peter M. Shane, Presi-
dential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 1235 (1981); Peter L. Strauiss & Cass R. Sunstein,
The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986).
275. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of
the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419 (1987) (analyzing the delegation debate in
terms of three competing ideals of the administrative process-the rule of law ideal, the
public purposes ideal, and the democratic process ideal); Sargentich, supra note 273 (dis-
cussing competing ideals of the administrative process).
276. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 106, at 358-59; Lowi, supra note 259, at xi. Lowi wrote:
The accumulated changes in national government since the 1930s have brought
the United States into an entirely new constitutional epoch. The two most im-
portant changes are the development of a large professional bureaucracy and
the enlargement of the presidency ... Woodrow Wilson characterized the re-
gime of the 1880s as congressional government. The regime of the 1980s can be
characterized as presidential government."
Id.
277. High popular expectations, combined with practical limits on the President's powers,
have been seen by some to account for recurring weaknesses in the position of Presidents.
See, e.g., NEUSTADT, supra note 259, at 202 (noting that modern Presidents have duties and
expectations in excess of their "assured capacity" to carry through on desired policies).
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managerial values risks seriously unbalancing the relations be-
tween the two political branches.
One therefore should not be misled into thinking that parlia-
mentary critics seek to advance the interests of the Parliament
or the legislature. This misunderstanding might be understand-
able given the literature's rhetoric praising Bagehot's model of gov-
ernment,18 under which independent Members of Parliament
thoughtfully voted their consciences on the great issues of the
day.27 9 The modern critique in the United States, however, is a
managerially oriented, presidentially focused approach that exalts
hierarchical control of policymaking by the executive. Again, this
set of commitments may have a good deal of force when one is
considering the executive branch by itself. When used as the prism
through which to view the interaction of the executive and legisla-
tive branches, however, the vision seriously undermines the role of
checks and balances in general and Congress in particular.
b. The Principle of Dialogue Underlying the
Constitution's Structure
In turning now to the principle of dialogue underlying the Con-
stitution's structure, it is important first to note a basic distinction.
The Constitution's structural theory rests on two closely related
but nevertheless separate principles: separation of powers and
checks and balances. 80 The first principle requires that the
branches of government be identifiably discrete. The second as-
sumes that the branches are separate and then concentrates on
promoting the checking of each by the others. 28 ' The task of sepa-
ration summons forth a "formalist" analysis; it requires formal
definitions of some sort to provide the baseline for analysis. The
task of checking and balancing is most closely associated with a
"functionalist" approach; it requires an awareness of the need to
278. See supra text accompanying note 119 (noting Henry Hazlitt's praise of Bagehot).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
280. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-38 (1987).
281. See id. at 435.
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balance the roles and functions of different institutions in deter-
mining their appropriate relations. 8 2
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest among
courts, lawyers, and legal scholars in the doctrine and theory of the
separation of powers and checks and balances. 83 It is unsurprising
that attention has focused on the methodological tension between
formalism and functionalism m particular cases.28 Yet the litera-
ture also has concentrated on the substantive values served by the
larger doctrine as a whole. Such discussions often have emphasized
the singular importance of the political dialogue and interaction
fostered by the Constitution's structure.285
The fundamental idea is that through the separation of powers
and checks and balances, different voices-those of the President,
the Senate, and the House of Representatives-can be expected to
contribute to public debate about the ends and means of national
policy. The notions are familiar: the President speaks as the na-
tionally elected voice of the people generally; the Senate represents
the states; and the House represents particular constituencies that
often have highly local concerns. More generally, the President
speaks for the nation, and members of Congress-while being con-
cerned with matters of national import-speak especially for dif-
282. For discussion of formalism and functionalism in separation of powers analysis, see
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions: A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
283. See, e.g., Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLIcTs BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT (3d rev. ed. 1991); Erwin Chemermsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Com-
ment on the Burger Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1083 (1987); David P Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT.
REV. 19; Daniel J. Gifford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Regulatory Agencies
After Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 441 (1987); Harold J. Krent, Separating the
Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253 (1988); Sargentich,
supra note 280; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984). See generally MODERN CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 178-239 (John H. Garvey & T. Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 2d
ed. 1991) (collecting readings on the separation of powers); Symposium, The Uneasy Con-
stitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1987).
284. See, e.g., Keith Werhan, Toward an Eclectic Approach to Separation of Powers:
Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 393, 425-34 (1989).
285. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 282 (arguing against a rigid understanding of govern-
ment below the level of the actors named in the Constitution-Congress, President, and
Supreme Court-and in favor of a checks and balances perspective that focuses on the ongo-
ing interactions among the three branches).
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ferent constituent parts of the nation. This constitutional structure
guarantees that diverse perspectives will contribute to dialogue
about public policy.2"6 Such a system is in direct tension with the
top-down imperatives of the managerial ethos of parliamen-
tarism.2
87
Certain caveats are important here. First, the Constitution's
structure cannot be assumed to guarantee an optimally broad dia-
logue among different groups in the polity. To the contrary, there
are major constraints on the scope of political debate, especially
including the relative powerlessness of certain groups. Much more
should be done in my view to broaden political dialogue in order to
include unrepresented voices. Second, separation of powers and
checks and balances are designed to moderate the tendencies of a
full-blown democratic regime, which could be swayed by momen-
tary impulses of an aroused public. To that extent, the idea of dia-
logue in the context of the Constitution's structure needs to be dis-
tinguished from pure democratic rule.288 Third, other countries
have evolved their own systems for achieving dialogue; my com-
ments are directed specifically at the system in the United States.
286. See, e.g., Philip C. Bobbitt, The Committee on the Constitutional System Propos-
als: Coherence and Dominance, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 403, 406 (1989) (noting that the
government's legitimacy under the Constitution depends on there being "three different
dimensions of constituency"); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 489-90 (1987) (contending that more political voices are expressed in a
division of powers system); see also supra text accompanying notes 236-41 (discussing the
accountability argument's tendency to downplay divergent views about public issues).
287. None of the text's discussion of public deliberation is meant to deny that the dia-
logue has self-interested dimensions. In recent years, a large body of literature has discussed
the fact that groups and individuals pursue their self-interest through the legislative pro-
cess. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PIrr. L. REV. 691 (1987); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tax. L. REv. 873 (1987); Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretations: An Inter-
est Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
288. The desire to check pure democratic rule is reflected in various constitutional provi-
sions, including the original provision for the indirect election of Senators. Until the passage
of the 17th Amendment in 1913, Senators were chosen by state legislatures. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 3, cl, 1, amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII, § 1. Major checks on pure democratic
rule remain in the bicameralism requirement, id. art. I, § 1, the President's veto power, id. §
7, and the practice of judicial review of legislative and executive actions.
[Vol. 34:679
LIMITS OF PARLIAMENTARY CRITIQUE
Nevertheless, fundamental values are at stake. Foremost among
them are the ideas of expanded access to power and broad dialogue
in the context of our constitutional and political system. The pos-
sibilities of expanded access and dialogue follow directly from the
fact that the constitutional structure is more decentralized, less
unified, and thus less managerially neat than many parliamentari-
ans would prefer. Because different institutions share power, indi-
viduals and groups may have a greater chance of winning the ear of
some powerful official in their efforts to achieve representation.
The significance of this fact is highlighted by taking the perspec-
tive of those who might not otherwise gain a political hearing, for
instance because they do not have majority support and are not
likely to achieve it in the future.289
Expansion of political access and dialogue is an intelligent re-
sponse to the social diversity of the United States. Having multiple
pathways to power can assist in channelling social conflict in an
internally riven social context.2 0 Indeed, since our nation is so di-
versified, it is unsurprising that people are often reluctant to em-
brace the idea of unity in government.29
The Constitution's structure also is reassuring on the level of
day-to-day partisanship, as noted earlier. For those who oppose the
policies of a given administration, the value of checks on the exec-
utive is obvious.292 Vigorous dialogue about policymaking fostered
by checks and balances also serves a number of affirmative pur-
289. Cf. HARDIN, supra note 107, at 141 (contending. that people "can also have a sense of
ongoing participation in government if they are members of an effective and reasonably
steadfast majority-or of a minority with a good chance of becoming a majority").
290. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Question's Not Clear, But Party Government Is Not
the Answer, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 411, 415 (1989) ("No group wins or loses all the time.
As a result, no group need feel completely disenfranchised and better off working to over-
throw the system of government. This stability is probably the most notable and desirable
feature of the American system . . . ."); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and
Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 621-22 (1989)
(discussing the value of the diffusion of power in the American constitutional system in
terms of its contribution to liberty and stability in the polity).
291. See DON K. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 139 (1983), excerpted as
Words of Caution About Structural Change, in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra
note 5, at 39, 43 ("Especially in a larger federal system, with a diverse population, it is
inevitable that the electorate will want to draw back from the idea of a tightly unified sys-
tem. .. ").
292. For arguments in the British context, see sources cited supra note 247.
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poses. In particular, it can promote better decisions by encouraging
fuller consideration of significant alternatives.9 3
In addition, separation of powers and checks and balances can
help to prevent the dominance of particular factions or special in-
terests. 94 A major theme of discussions of the U.S. government has
been that factions frequently gain more power than their numbers
warrant. 9 5 The overriding question has been how to control or
limit the negative effects of special interests. Increasingly, com-
mentators have noted that a healthy system of checks and bal-
ances, fostering debate about the impacts of governmental action
as well as about competing public values, can help to ameliorate
the problem of faction.29 6 This notion does not have to be cast only
in terms of having certain selfish interests check other selfish inter-
ests. 97 More generally, the contest among competing public vi-
sions, resting on larger commitments to the general good, can play
out openly in a scheme of active checks and balances.29 8 To be
293. See Ceaser, supra note 225, at 186 ("[Ilt may well be that the information relevant
to making decisions can best become known under a system of multiple checks and diverse
points of entry that allows the effects of any proposed policy to be gauged in an intensely
political process.").
294. For a classic definition of "faction," see THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("A number of citizens, whether amounting to a major-
ity or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggre-
gate interests of the community.").
295. For criticism of interest group liberalism, see Lowi, supra 237, at 58-63; id. at 62
("Interest group liberal solutions to the problem of power provide the system with stability
by spreading a sense of representation at the expense of genuine flexibility, at the expense
of democratic forms, and ultimately at the expense of legitimacy."). For discussion of inter-
est groups in American politics, see INTEREST GROUP POLITICS (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A.
Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991). For an illuminating discussion of policy subsystems involving
interested individuals and groups, congressional committees or subcommittees, and federal
agencies or units within agencies, see James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in
American Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra, at 319.
296. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29,
44 (1985) ("The system of checks and balances within the federal structure was intended to
operate as a check against self-interested representation and factional tyranny in the event
that national officials failed to fulfill their responsibilities.").
297. Checks and balances are often defended in terms of selfish interests checking selfish
interests. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.").
298. See Sunstein, supra note 296, at 47 ("The federalists. . achieved a kind of synthe-
sis of republicanism and the emerging principles of pluralism. Politics rightly consisted of
deliberation and discussion about the public good."). For a critique of "civic virtue" theory,
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sure, a focus on the amelioration of factional dominance should not
lead one to a romanticized image of American political debate. Yet
the point remains that the program of promoting checks and bal-
ances can have a moderating impact on factional control of
government.
One might say in response that the broader the dialogue, the
harder it will be to make any decision that sticks. One can under-
stand the impulses for clarity that inform such a response. A sys-
tem of separation of powers and checks and balances does carry
with it a considerable potential for messiness and untidiness.
Whatever else one might say about the Supreme Court's opinion in
INS v. Chadha,299 the Court put well the basic point relevant here:
"Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the
hallmarks-of democratic government" as envisioned in the
United States Constitution.300
Without meaning at all to suggest that the Constitution's system
is ideal, one can say that it advances significant values and that
these values are not sufficiently acknowledged by the parliamen-
tary critique. After all, unity and effectiveness can exist in an auto-
cratic system that is hostile to the norms of open dialogue. If we
see broadened political debate in the United States as an impor-
particularly including the works of Professor Sunstein, see Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1988). Fitts emphasizes political science studies of parties as vehi-
cles for structuring dialogue about public affairs. See id. at 1603-12. He also criticizes the
diffusion of power within Congress as a factor enhancing the influence of special interest
groups. See id. at 1628-30.
299. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
300. Id. at 944. Chadha raised the question of the constitutionality of legislative veto
devices, by which Congress, or a portion of it, adopts resolutions that are not presented to
the President and that purport to have the force and effect of law. The Court held that such
resolutions are legislative actions for purposes of Article I and therefore need to conform to
the Constitution's requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the President for
approval or veto. See id. at 944-51. The Court's emphasis on the need to follow a plenary
legislative process reinforces the importance of broad-based dialogue in the enunciation of
legislative policy. See Sunstein, supra note 296, at 53. The Supreme Court has noted:
That this system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, con-
fusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was deliberately so struc-
tured to assure full, vigorous, and open debate on the great issues affecting the
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of
governmental power.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
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tant public aim, then we should expect-and embrace-some
trade-offs in terms of managerial neatness.
IV. CONCLUSION
For decades, parliamentary critics of the separation of powers
have reproduced the same basic analysis of the structure of govern-
ment in the United States. In the 1880s, Woodrow Wilson argued
that the division between the legislature and the executive was a
guarantee of ineffectual government."' 1 In the early 1920s, William
MacDonald expressed similar concerns when claiming, rather in-
consistently, that our governmental structure was the source of the
public's "feeling of indifference" toward political affairs as well as
of "the thinly disguised talk of revolution. 3 0 2 During World War
II, Henry Hazlitt worried about the nation's ability to win the war
given the constraints of the separation of powers. 3 At the end of
World War II, Thomas Finletter feared that the United States
could not lead the western alliance during peace time unless "radi-
cal improvements" were made in the federal constitutional struc-
ture.3 0 4 During the Watergate period, Charles Hardin expressed
grave concerns about the future of our government in the absence
of parliamentary-style changes.3 0 5 During the 1980s, other parlia-
mentary critics attributed growing national budget deficits to
weaknesses in our constitutional structure.30 6
No doubt, tomorrow will bring other issues to prominence along
with renewed attacks on the separation of powers. Yet it seems
clear that no single answer can be an all-purpose response to each
major challenge to our government. A one-size-fits-all approach is
inappropriate given the complexity of modern society and politics.
In the end, when one looks beyond the details of parliamentary
proposals to their underlying premises, one finds serious empirical
301. See generally WILSON, supra note 29; supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
302. MACDONALD, supra note 107, at 29-30. MacDonald did not reconcile the apparent
tension between a stance of indifference and one of revolution.
303. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
304. FINLErrER, supra note 107, at 1-9 (suggesting that America's post-World War II do-
mestic and foreign interests could not be adequately realized through the constitutional gov-
ernmental process).
305. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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and normative limits. As an empirical matter, notwithstanding pre-
dictions to the contrary, the constitutional system has neither col-
lapsed nor proven unable to adopt innovative policies. Moreover,
periods of supposed political stalemate in our history can be ac-
counted for by a number of explanations other than one solely
dealing with structural features of our constitutional arrangement.
Furthermore, the managerial ethos of parliamentary reformism is
in direct tension with important values associated with the dia-
logue that attends our system of checks and balances. The term
"parliamentary reform" should not be allowed to cloud the fact
that the critics advance a highly pro-executive position that would
seek a strong government primarily by undercutting the indepen-
dence of Congress.
The main limits of the parliamentary critique should be kept in
mind as we continue to examine ways to make our government
more responsive to the needs of individuals and the community.
On the one hand, we should be quite wary of calls for change in the
direction of a parliamentary system. On the other hand, we should
be alert to the importance of a relatively open and deliberative
political system that not only upholds the ideals of separation
of powers and checks and balances, but also pursues reasonably
efficacious responses to particular problems. It has been said that
"'we live in the description of a place and not in the place it-
self.' ,,307 This is as true of our vision of political possibilities as of
anything else. We ultimately are responsible for developing and
defending the images-the descriptions-that resonate with public
values we embrace.
307. Robert N. Bellah, American Civil Religion in the 1970's, ANGLICAN THEO. REV. Supp.
SERIES, July 1973, at 8, 9 (quoting Wallace Stevens).
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